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Health Insurer Merger Frenzy: How the Continued
Arms Race Will Disrupt Traditional Market Roles
Erin E. Dine and MaryKathryn Hurd*
INTRODUCTION
Health care is an inherently irrational market. Unlike any other consumer
market, the demand for health care is irregular and unpredictable. Illness
knows no economic boundaries. Individuals do not receive advance notice as
to when illness will arrive, evidence of health care-s spontaneity-s
dismantling effect. Illness creates an immediacy for action that is
unparalleled to any other market With illness, our physical and mental
abilities, our livelihoods, and our lifestyles are at risk and that risk exists for
all. Due to health-s unpredictable nature, but ubiquitous societal need, health
care insurers are continuously challenged to craft successful markets around
such volatility.
T he Affordable Care Act (A CA),1 market pressures, and growing provider
consolidation have created the opportunity for proposed mega-health
insurance mergers between Aetna and Humana and Anthem and Cigna.2
While antitrust laws will evaluate these proposed mergers, whether the
agencies enforcing these laws will ultimately prevent this potential
competitive oligopoly remains unknown. If the proposed mergers pass
antitrust regulators- approval process, these transactions would produce three
mega-i nsurance companies domi nati ng the health insurance market forcing
health systems to keep the reimbursement arms race even by consolidating.
In their current roles, insurance companies pressure providers to keep costs
* Erin E. Dine is aJ.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2017, Beazley
Institute for Health Law and Policy Fellow. MaryKathryn Hurd is aJ.D. Candidate, Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, 2017, Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy Fellow.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. f 18001 (2010).
2. Aetna to Acquire Hurnna for $37 Billion, Combined Entity to Drive Consurmer-
Focused, High-Value Healthcare, AETNA UJuly 3, 2015), https://news.aetna.comnews-
releases/aetna-to-acquire-hurmna-for-37-billion-com-bined-entity-to-drive-consurmer-
focused-high-value-health-care/; Anthem Announces Definitive Agreermnt to Acquire Cigna
Corporation, ANTHEM, INC. U uly 24, 2015), http:/ir.antheminc.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=1301
04& p=irol-newsA rticle&ID=2070832.
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low, while providers in fee-for-service models are paid more, the more care
they deliver.' The ever-increasing fight for economic dominance between
providers and insurers will ultimately split when providers break independent
from insurers and take on new roles as payors. This article argues that the
approval of these mergers will drive health care providers and systems to
create their own health plans, taking on full risk for patients. This article
proposes that provider-owned health plans will effectively eliminate the need
for the traditional third-party insurance intermediary. With incentives
internally aligned, the tension to provide less care from the insurers, or to
provide more carefromthe providers, will be alleviated by aligned incentives
of having both roles served by the same entity. This change will render
insurance companies, in their current roles, obsolete.
This article proposes that in response to proposed mergers, providers,
specifically hospitals, will create their own insurance companies, building a
model that encompasses both the delivery and financing of health care,
achieving high-quality, low-cost care. Part I of this article will discuss the
possible health insurance landscape upon the approval of the proposed
insurer mergers and the drivers that are accelerating the consolidation trend
amongst health insurance companies. Part II of this article will discuss the
concerns associated with this insurance consolidation trend. Part III of this
article will discuss the antitrust laws that are used to evaluate proposed
mergers, the status of the mergers today, and how they will likely move
forward. Part IV will propose that as a result of the new responsibilities,
payrment structures, and reimbursement pressures within the reformed health
care delivery system, health care systems should seize on the opportunity to
expand their roles beyond that of provider, entering the health insurance
business and providing competition to potential 'mega-insurers.
I. BACKGROUND
The recent announcement that the top five health insurers plan to merge to
just three has generated concerns about the deals- impact on the healthcare
market.4 On J uly 3, 2015, Aetna and Humana announced the definitive
3. See Should the U.S. MoveAwayfrom Fee-for-Service Medicine, WALL STREETJ. (Mar.
22, 2015, 11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/should-the-u-s-move-away-from-fee-for-
service-medicine-1427079653 (noting that under the fee-for-service reimbursement model,
'providers stand to make more money the more tests and procedures they perform_); see also
Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-
service/256755/(noting that under a fee-for-service model, payors reimburse providers for all
services 'regardless of their impact on patient health_ and describing the fee-for-service
payment system as the 'culprit behind exponential health-care cost growth_).
4. Steve Sternberg, Health Insurer Mergers Signify Shift in Health Care Marketplace,
U.S. NEWS (Aug. 21, 2015, 1:23 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/21/
2016 99
2
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol25/iss2/5
Annals of Health Law
agreement whereby A etna will acquire all of H umana s outstanding shares
for $37 billion.' In December 2015, A nthem proposed to purchase Cigna for
$54 billion.6 If these proposed mergers are approved, the healthcare industry
will be left primarily with three mega insurance companies: Aetna, Anthem,
and UnitedHealth Group.7 Each of the three main players would possess a
net worth of $100 billion if the anticipated mergers receive approval.'
As of February 2016, the transaction between A etna and Human secured
ten out of the twenty needed state insurance approvals.9 Aetna-s acquisition
of Humana focuses on aligning Humana-s growing Medicare Advantage
health plan business with Aetna-s diversified commercial capabilities.10
While Aetna-s business is spread throughout employers, Medicare, and
Medicaid," if Aetna-s acquisition of Humana is approved, 'Aetna would
become the largest provider of Medicare advantage plans. _12
The unprecedented consolidation among health plans caused the
shareholders of Anthem and Cigna to approve Anthems purchase of Cigna-
a stock acquisition plan that could potentially create the nation-s largest
health insurance company. Anthem is a Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan
provider and has a strong presence in the individual, small-employer, and
multistate-employer health insurance marketplace.14 Cigna has a
health-i nsurer- mergers-si gnify-shift-i n-health-care-marketplace.
5. Aetna to Acquire Humna for $37 Billion, Combined Entity to Drive Consumer-
Focused, High-Value Health Care, AETNA, https://news.aetna.com/201 5/08/aetna-to-acquire-
humana/(last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
6. Bruce J apsen, Anthemr Cigna Shareholders Approve Merger as Antitrust Hurdles
Await, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2015, 11:06 AM), http://www.forbes.comsites/brucejapsen/2015/
1 2/03/antitrust-hurdl es-await-anthem-cigna-after-shareholders-approve-
merger/#550ce55067b0.
7. Swarup Gupta, Health Insurance Consolidation Heats Up: 4 Stock Choices, ZACKS
INVESTMENT RES. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.zacks.comstock/news/190956/health-
insurance-consol idation-heats-up-4-stock-choi ces.
8. Id.
9. Kshitiz Goliya, Aetna Gets Florida Insurance Regulator-sApproval for Humna Deal,
REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2016, 10:38 PM), http://www.reuters.comarticle/us-humana-m-a-aetna-
idUSKCNOV PO9X.
10. AETNA, supra note 5; Anna Wilde Mathews & Brent Kendall, Health Insurers Aetna,
Anthem Defend Deals, Say Markets Will Stay Competitive, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2015,
12:48 PM), http://www.wsj.comarticles/aetna-anthem-defend-insurance-deals-contend-
markets-will-remain-comrpetitive-1442938512.
11. Bob Herman, Potential Insurance Mergers Could Spur More Provider Consolidation,
MODERN HEALTHCARE U une 20, 2015), http://www.rmodernhealthcare.comarticle/20150620/
MAGAZINE/306209961 [hereinafter Herman, Potential Insurance Mergers].
12. Ana Radelat, AMA AsksJ ustice Department to Block Aetna-H urnna, Anthem-Cigna
Mergers, CT MIRROR (Nov. 12, 2015), http://ctnirror.org/2015/11/12/ama-asks-justice-
departrrent-to-block-aetna-humana-anthem-cigna- mergers/.
13. J apsen, supra note 6.
14. Anna Wilde Mathews & Liz Hoffman, AnthemAgrees to Buy Cigna for $48.4 Billion,
WALL STREET J. UJuly 24, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.wsj.comarticles/anthem-agrees-to-
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commanding focus in the larger-employer health plan marketplace,
specifically overseas.1s Anthem and Cigna are the second and fifth largest
revenue-producing health insurers, and the merger would generate a large
impact in commercial health insurance, or health insurance provided to
employers and consumers. 16 Al though the merger still requires approval from
federal regulators, the transaction is expected to close in 2016.17 C igna-s CEO
states that the two companies have 'very complementary strengths_ and that
'the companies strongest markets are generally not in the same places._1
A nthem and Cigna claim their merger deal will improve the cost of insurance
and produce a broad range of health insurance products and services." The
merger of Anthem and Cigna would knock U nitedH ealth Group (U H G) to
the second largest health insurance company by enrollment. 20
The idea that the five largest health insurance companies could shrink to
just three mega-i nsurance companies has caused worry amongst consumers,
providers, and the healthcare industry as a whole.21 Given the potential global
impact on the healthcare market, it is imperative these deals are critically
evaluated.22
A. Drivers of Insurance Consolidation
Everyone will need medi cal care at some point. What remai ns uncertain is
what ki nd of care, when that care will be needed, or how much that care will
cost. To further complicate the issue, health care is a non-transparent
market.23 Unlike a hair salon, a restaurant, or a car dealership, few providers
post prices for treatment and even if they did, higher prices do not necessarily
correlate with higher-quality care.24
To help individuals prepare for their inevitable healthcare needs, the ACA
buy-cigna-for-48-billion-1437732331.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. J apsen, supra note 6.
18. Mathews & Hoffman, supra note 14.
19. Id.
20. J apsen, supra note 6. UnitedHealth Group Inc. is the largest revenue-produci ng health
insurer and has, so far, avoided the merger wave. Mathews & Hoffman, supra note 14.
21. J apsen, supra note 6.
22. Leemore S. Dafny, Evaluating the Impact of Health Insurance Industry
Consolidation: Learning from Experience, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.comrmonwealthfund.org/publicationsfissue-briefs/2015/nov/evaluating-
insurance-industry-consolidation.
23. Molly Gamble, How Much Should We Expect Healthcare to Mimic Other Industries?,
BECKER-s HOSP. REV. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-
management-admi ni strati on/how-much-should-we-expect- healthcare-to-mi mi c-other-
industries.htd.
24. Id.
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sought to increase access to health insurance through expansion of Medicaid
and state-based insurance exchanges.25 The ACA created state-based
marketplaces in an effort to cultivate competition and options for consumers
and incentivize insurers to participate.26 To encourage quality-producing
collaboration, the ACA incentivized providers to create coordinated systems
of care through the Medicare Shared Savings Program 27
This shift in how consumers acquire health insurance coverage created
instability in the marketplace.28 While insurers attempted to navigate the new
state and federal exchange standards, providers began consolidating to
transition their care models to coordinate care and reimbursement
structures. 29 As each player tried to stay relevant in this new marketplace,
providers saw mergers and acquisitions as an opportunity to gain market
share and meet coordi nated-care standards.
Although the ACA is often cited as a main driver of recent consolidation
in the healthcare market,o consolidation in the market was 'well under way
before the passage of the A CA. 1 In the 1980s and 1990s, public and private
payors rapidly adopted managed care as a way to decrease healthcare costs
through restricting utilization and limiting access to specialty providers.32
25. David Cusano & Kevin Lucia, Implementing the Affordable Care Act:
Promoting Competition in the Individual Marketplaces, COMMONWEALTH FUND
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.comrmonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2016/feb/aca-
competition-i ndividual-rmarketplaces.
26. 42U.S.CA 18041(2010).
27. 42 U.S.C. f 1395jjj (2010).
28. Robert Pear & Abby Goodnough, Instability in Marketplaces Draws Concern on Both
Sides of Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/28/us/
pol iticsfi nstabi I ity-i n-marketplaces-draws-concern-on-both-sides-of-health-law. html?_ r-0.
29. John Santilli & F. Randy Vogenberg, Key Strategic Trends that Impact Healthcare
Decision-Making and Stakeholder Roles in the New Marketplace, 8 AMER. HEALTH & DRUG
BENEFITS 15, 16-18 (Feb. 2015), http://www.ncbi.nlrmnih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4415172/
pdf/ahdb-08-015.pdf. William Walters, the CEO of the Acute Long Term Care Hospital
Association, noted that the wave of provider mergers 'is less about market leverage and much
more about regulatory uncertainty and the lack of other options to pursue growth. Jessica
Zigmond, First Consolidation, Then Consolidation, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.modernhealthcare.comarticle/20110926/magazine/309269936. Walters further
noted that providers are consolidated as a way to 'position themselves for the future_ in order
to provide a wider range of services through accountable care organizations or bundled
payments. Id.
30. See Christopher M. Pope, How the Affordable Care Act Fuels Health Care Market
Consolidation, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug 1, 2014),
http://report.heritage.org/bg2928 (arguing consolidation in health care is due to the ACA s
anti-competitive policies and not natural market forces).
31. Dafny, supra note 22.
32. Ronald Lagoe et al., Current and Future Developments in Managed Care in the
United States and Europe, HEALTH RES. & POLY SYs. (2005), http://health-policy-
systems.biomedcentral.comarticles/10.1186/1478-4505-3-4 ('The proportion of employees
in large firms (those with more than 200 employees) enrolled in managed care plans grew
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Managed care organizations (MCO) negotiated contracts with providers for
lower rates in exchange for greater volume of patients." MCOs and
corresponding health plans were successful in cutting costs in a variety of
setti ngs.
In response to the success of managed care, insurance companies merged
and bought out smaller provider groups in an effort to increase profit3 s To
counter the narrowly drafted contracts, hospitals consolidated 3 6 to create
integrated networks that could increase both system efficiencies and
negotiating power.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, consumers were outraged
with denials and inconsistent coverage decisions that corresponded with
managed care.38 The pushback against managed care led to loosening of
restrictions, dissolution of MCOs, and a correlating increase in healthcare
costs.39 The wave of provider mergers that occurred under managed care
waned in the early 2000s, but the ACA rejuvenated the trend.40 W hi le the
ACA did not create the wave of consolidation, it created a landscape that
encouraged it Smaller profit margins, coupled with the higher costs of
complying with the ACA s reforms, have pushed both providers and payors
toward greater integration and consolidation.41
from 5 percent in 1984 to 50 percent in 1993. As the use of managed care spread, interest in
traditional indemnity plans declined. By 1998, only 14 percent of employees in large firms
were enrolled in indemnity insurance plans._.
33. Health Care Costs and Managed Care, MICH. IN BRIEF, http://www.nichiganinbrief.
org/editionO7/Chapter5/HealthCareCosts.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2002).
34. Id.
35. Peter D. Fox & Peter R. Kongstvedt, A History of Managed Care and Health
Insurance in the United States, in HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE: WHAT THEY ARE
AND How THEY WORK 1, 14 (4th Ed. 2016), http://samrples.jbpub.com9781284043259/
Chapterl.pdf ('By 1999, multistate firms, including Kaiser Permanente and the combined
Blue Cross Blue Shield Plans, accounted for three-fourths of U.S. enrollment in managed
care. ).
36. Id. at 16 (noting the fact that over 900 hospital mergers occurred in the 1 990s and that
this trend lead to an early 2000s study of metropolitan areas showing 90 percent were 'highly
concentrated_ by health systems); David Dranove et al., Is Managed Care Leading to
Consolidation in Health-Care Markets?, 37 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 573, 5740une2002).
37. UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FOUND. OF CONN., HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATIONS AND
CONVERSIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 3 (Dec. 2014), http://universalhealthct.org/
images/publications/Hospital Consolidations and Conversions.pdf.
38. Stanford GSB Staff, Managed Care: What Went Wrong? Can It Be Fixed? STANFORD
Bus. INSIGHTS (Nov. 1, 1999), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/managed-care-what-
went-wrong-can-it-be-fixed ('In July 1999, the Kaiser Family Foundation published a survey
that found that 87% of doctors said that their patients have experienced health plan denials of
coverage for health services over the last two years. _.
39. Fox & K ongstvedt, supra note 35, at 22.
40. Bara Vaida, Health Care Consolidation, ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM (Oct. 11,
2013), http://www.allhealth.org/publications/Health-Care-Consolidation-Toolkit_157.pdf.
41. See Sternberg, supra note 4 (noting that the health care reforms within the ACA 'will
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T he A CA ai med to create a high-quality, cost-effective healthcare del ivery
system through care coordination.42 The ACA intentionally incentivizes
providers to coordinate patient care as a way to increase quality.43 Providers
achieve the ACA-s goal of high-quality care by collaboratively working to
prevent unnecessary services and treat issues before they become expensive
medical emergencies44 Historically, health care lacked an incentive structure
that would encourage providers to collaborate with the competing provider
within the community, creating an overall fragmented industry.45 With
repeated threats regarding the potential repeal of the ACA, stakeholders were
initially hesitantto make major consolidation moves beforethe United States
Supreme Court affirmed and reaffirmed the ACA s constitutionality.4 6 In this
post-ACA market, providers, payors, manufacturers, and distributors see
consolidation not only as a way to gain market efficiencies and increase
profits, but as a necessary step to remain viable in a market where competitors
are also merging and expanding in scope, size, and negotiating power.47
To deliver population health and chronic disease management, health
systems are creating integrated healthcare systems. 8 With this goal in mind,
the pace of consolidation accelerated subsequent the passage of the A CA.49
likely shrink insurers- profit margins. .. because they will no longer be able to deny
individuals with pre-existing conditions, and at the same time must limit how rmuch they raise
their rates_).
42. David Brodwin, Death by Monopoly, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 17, 2015, 8:30 AM),
http://www.usnews.comopinion/econorric-intelligence/2015/08/17/health-care-
consolidation-is-a-disease-not-a-cure.
43. 42 U.S.C.f 1395jjj (2010) (noting that theACA through the Medicare Shared Savings
Program incentivizes groups of providers to 'work together to manage and coordinate care for
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries_).
44. Id. (noting that the ACA through the Medicare Shared Savings Program incentivizes
groups of providers to 'work together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-
service beneficiaries).
45. Bill Woodson, Behind Healthcare-s M&A Boom FORTUNE (Aug. 18, 2015 11:05
AM), http://fortune.conV2015/08/1 8/healthcare-ma-aetna-anthem-cigna/.
46. Nati Fed-n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 5. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012); Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 5. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014); Michael J. de la Merced, Humna
Said to Pursue Sale as Supreme Court Ruling Gives Insurers a Lift, N.Y. TIMES U une 25,
2015), http://www.nytirres.com2015/06/26/business/dealbook/hurmna-said-to-pursue-sale-
as-courts-ruling-gives-insurers-a-lift.htnl?_ r=0 (stating repeated affirmation of ACA-s
constitutionality bolsters health industry confidence to move into new markets).
47. Reed Abelson, Health Care Companies in Merger Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/business/dealbook/health-care-comrpanies-in-
merger-frenzy.htnl.
48. Beth K utscher, Hospitals Struggle to Balance Current Costs with F uture Benefits of
Employing Docs, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com'
article/20140222/MAGAZINE/302229986.
49. Anna Wilde Mathews, Health-Care Providers, Insurers Supersize, WALL STREET J.
(Sept. 21, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/health-care-providers-insurers-
supersize-1442850400 (noting that '[t] he ACA is a trigger_).
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In the five years after the ACA enactment the number of hospital mergers
doubled.s0 In the short time span from 2012 to 2014, approximately 300
hospital and system mergers were announced.s" Hospitals have also
participated in 'a physician buying spree. _52 In 2000, one in twenty
specialists were hospital employees; as of 2015, that ratio has dropped to one
in four. 3
The consolidation trend is not linited to insurers and providers.
Pharmaceutical companies have also consolidated to streanline its research
and development efforts and to restructure to a more productive business
model.' The need for electronic medical records and high-end technology
are two major causes of the robust pace of post-acute care facility mergers."
This economic drive toward consolidation across the healthcare market is
seen by some as a 'long-overdue restructuring of [an] industry_ that has
traditionally been fragmented. 6 But the restructuring will not stop there.
Hospitals and other healthcare providers have consolidated with their
industry competitors; however, the coordination of care goals inherent to the
ACA will not be achieved by merely consolidating with the neighboring
competitor. Creating scale is vital, but health systems will only achieve
coordinated care goals by strategically partnering with the various players
throughout the industry." As the nation-s Baby Boomers continue to age,
50. Scott W. Altas, Under Obarncare, Hospitals Merge, Doctors Merge, and Patients
Pay More for Less, NAT I REV. (Nov. 25, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.comf
arti cl e/427601 /alarni ng-consol i dati on-health-care-under-obarmcare.
51. Kristen Schorsch, Big Hospitals vs. Big Government in Merger Fight, CRAINIS
CHI. Bus. (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.chicagobusiness.comarticle/20160102/ISSUE01/
301029991/big-hospital s-vs-big-government-i n-merger-fight.
52. Id.
53. David Brodwin, supra note 42.
54. Jordan Paradise, A Profileof Bio-Pharma Consolidation Activity, 26ANNALS HEALTH
L. (forthcomingj une 2016); see Antoine Gara, Pfizer and Allergen Merger Ranks as Biggest-
Ever Pharmaceutical Deal, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2015, 9:52 AM), http://www.forbes.comf
sites/antoinegara/2015/11/23/pfizer-and-allergan-rrerger-ranks-as-biggest-ever-
pharmaceutical-deal/#423450dc3332 (noting that the 'blistering pace of pharmaceutical
merger and acquisition activity_ sterms from pharmaceutical companies prioritizing business
models that focus of efficiency).
55. David Friend, Post-Acute Care M&A-2014 Outlook, BDO HEALTHCARE
PRACTICE 1, 1 (Spring 2014), http://bertsmithco.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2014-
BDO-KnowsHealthcare-NewsletterSpring.pdf; see Kindred, Gentiva Merge to Create
Massive Post-Acute Care Systemr ADVISORY BD. Co., (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:00 AM),
https://www.advisory.comdaily-briefing/2014/10/10/kindred-gentiva-merge-to-create-
massive-post-acute-care-system (noting the potential merger of Kindred Healthcare and
Gentiva Health Systems, a merger that could create 'one of the largest post-acute care
provider systems in the nation _).
56. Woodson, supra note 45.
57. SeeTammy Worth, When Providers Become Payers: What Hospitals Should Consider
Before Building a New Business Model, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.comnews/when- providers-become-payers (noting that
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acute care providers will find it difficult to provide a fully-integrated
continuumof care without integrating a post-acute care network." Hospitals
are increasing not only in size, but also in scope, creating versatile health
systems that offer a continuum of care to patient-consumers. 9 Provider
consolidations are a driving factor in existing and proposed rival insurance
consolidations. Both are evidence that the implementation of the ACA has
spurred the need for increased scale and pricing power.?
B. A Response to Ever-Increasing Provider Mergers
In an attempt to deliver efficient, low-cost health care through care
coordination, providers have accelerated consolidation efforts to meet these
goals. 6 1 As hospitals and systems continue to purchase provider groups and
cover more area, they increase their ability to negotiate for better rates from
insurance companies.6
This drive for negotiation power is pushing insurance companies to 'fight
back_ and further consolidate in an attempt to gain back leverage in setting
provider rates.' Insurers are legally obliged to cover 'medically necessary
care,' and therefore providers or hospital systems with a large market share
'every organization looking at someone else-s business thinks there is a tremendous amount
of waste, and believes they could do it better if given the opportunity ).
58. Friend, supra note 55.
59. Santilli & V ogenberg, supra note 29, at 17-18.
60. Gupta, supra note 7.
61. Brodwin, supra note 42 (noting, however, that although this was the ai nm evidence
demonstrates that consolidation eliminates competition, which results in higher prices).
Although economic benefits can derive from consolidation, there may be a point where a
health care system has all the potential economic benefits that enormity can bring. Id.
62. Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep
Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 973, 973 (May 2012), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224918834
TheGrowingPower Of_Sorme_ Providers_To_Win_SteepPaymentIncreases_ From_Insur
ersSuggests Policy_ Remedies_ MayBe Needed (noting that 'so-called rrust-have hospital
systems and large physician groups' providers that health plans must include in their
networks so that they are attractive to ermployers and consumers' can exert considerable
market power to obtain steep payment rates from insurers_).
63. See Reihan Salar The Threat of Health Care Market Consolidation, NAT L REV.
(Aug. 12, 2014, 5:27 PM), http://www.nationalreview.comagenda/385283/threat-health-care-
market-consolidation-reihan-salam (noting that private insurers 'have little choice but to play
ball with the dominant hospital group or health system in a given region_).
64. Pope, supra note 30. Cigna defines 'medical necessity _ as:
[H] ealth care services that a Physician, exercising prudent clinical judgment, would
provide to a patient for the purpose of evaluating, diagnosing or treating an illness,
injury, disease or its symptorms, and that are: a) in accordance with the generally
accepted standards of medical practice; b) clinically appropriate, in terms of type,
frequency, extent, site and duration, and considered effective for the patient-s
illness, injury or disease; and c) not primarily for the convenience of the patient or
Physician, or other Physician, and not more costly than an alternative service or
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in an area can dictate costs. 6 s In response to higher rate demands without
negotiating power, an insurer is forced to either pay higher prices or attempt
to cut a provider from its network.66 Insurers are now looking to consolidation
as a way to combat what they see as disproportionate price increases: 'Unless
companies in both sectors grow in size, they will not be in a position to meet
each other on equal terms when they enter into negotiations on contracts. 67
Beth Leonard, executive vice president of public affairs for A meri ca s H ealth
Insurance Plans (AHIP), the national association of health insurance
providers, stated that health plans work to provide better value for patients,
but that value 'is being undercut by years of anticompetitive hospital
consolidation that have forced patients to pay higher healthcare costs,
increased premiums, and limited their healthcare choices. _
Massachusetts offers a startling example of how provider consolidation in
a geographic area can quash an insurer -s abi Ii ty to negotiate reasonable rates.
In 1994, Massachusetts all owed the state-s two largest hospitals to merge into
a single system, enabling the systems leverage to drive up costs in the local
market.' The system demanded higher reimbursements unrelated to the
quality or complexity of care.70 The hospital s merger intended to decrease
insurers ability to demand lower prices from one hospital by threatening to
send patients to the other.71 In reality, the newly-merged entity demanded
unjustifiable price increases, and when insurers pushed back, the new system
simply announced they would no longer accept those insurers.72 T his caused
sequence of services at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or
diagnostic results as to the diagnosis or treatment of that patients illness, injury or
disease.
Medical Necessity for Physicians, CIGNA, http://www.cigna.com/healthcare-professionals/
resources-for- health-care-professionals/clinical-payment-and-reimbursement-
policies/medical-necessity-definitions (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
65. See Amy Y urkanin, Alabarm Anti-trust Case Against Blue Cross Will Move Ahead,
Judge Rules, AL.coM (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.al.com/newsfindex.ssf/2015/11/
alabamanti-trust case agains.htdn (noting a recent nationwide study by American Medical
Association finding Alabama as the least competitive commercial market in the U.S. with 93
percent of privately insured individuals in the state covered by Blue Cross); see Editorial, The
Risk of Hospital Mergers, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2014), http://www.nytirres.com/2014/
07/07/opinion/the-risks-of-hospital-mergers.html?_r-0 (noting that if adequate provide
competition is unavailable, hospital mergers can have a dominating impact on insurance
markets forcing set pricing for insurers).
66. Pope, supra note 30.
67. Gupta, supra note 7.
68. Lisa Schencker, Hospitals Take Aim at Big Insurance Mergers, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.rodernhealthcare.com/article/20150807/NEWS/
150809897.
69. Editorial, supra note 65.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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an uproar from consumers, who did not want to lose access to the two
community hospitals, as well as their providers.' With no other option, the
insurance company dropped its position and paid the higher rates.74 Provider
consolidation within a single geographic region can force payorsto negotiate
with a single powerful entity, allowing those entities to dictate higher prices
and reimbursement75
C. Medical Loss Ratio Standards
The ACA s attempt to increase and mandate access to health insurance
markets has created financial burdens to health insurance companies.76 In an
effort to provide increased consumer access to the health insurance market
the ACA mandated that insurance companies cannot deny coverage to
anyone with pre-existing conditions.' Traditionally, insurance companies
had the discretion to deny consumers with pre-existing conditions access to
their health plans and to charge increased premiums based on a consumer-s
gender or health status. T he A CA s mandate to insure individuals with pre-
existing conditions causes insurers to cover sicker and more expensive
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Pope, supra note 30; but cf. Bob Herman, Providers Fear Insurance Mergers Will
Intensify Rate Pressures, MODERN HEALTHCARE UJune 27, 2015) http://www.modern
healthcare.comfarticle/20150627/MA GAZIN E/306279934 [hereinafter Herman, Providers
Fear] (following Dr. RobertWergin, afamily medicine physician in Nebraska, whose practice
and local town-s critical-access hospital refused to sign network agreements with
UnitedHealthcare because the insurer demands discounts are 'too deep._); Eric Sun &
Lawrence Baker, Concentration in Orthopedic Markets Was Associated with a 7 Percent
Increase In Physician Fees for Total Knee Replacement, 34 HEALTH AFF. 916, 916 (June
2015), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/34/6/916.short (explaining a study conducted
regarding concentration in orthopedic markets, drawing conclusion that 'the resulting increase
in market concentration also could allow larger groups to negotiate higher physician fees from
private insurers. _.
76. See A nna Wi Ide Mathews, Health Insurers Struggle to Profit fromACA Plans, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 1, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.wsj.con-articles/health-laws-strains-show-
1446423498 (noting that '[h]ealth insurers lost a total of $2.5 billion, or on average $163 per
consumer enrolled, in the individual market in 2014).
77. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pub. L. No. 111-48, f 1101(d)(3), 124
Stat. 142 (2010) (codified as 42 U.S.C. f 18001) (determining that an individual that has a
'pre-existing condition_ is considered an 'eligible individual ). A pre-existing condition is a
health problem that a policy-holder had prior to start of the policy-holder-s new health plan
coverage. Pre-Existing Conditions, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.
gov/healthcare/about-the-law/pre-existing-conditionsfindex.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
Pre-existing conditions typically include expensive conditions such as asthma, diabetes, or
cancer. Id.
78. How ObarmaCare Affects Health Insurance Premium Rates, OBAMACARE FACTS
http://obarmcarefacts.com'obamacare-health-i nsurance-preni ums/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2016) [hereinafter ObarnCare Affects Health Insurance].
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populations.' The expensive pool of policyholders provokes insurers to hike
insurance premiums to combat the ACA s financially-burdening effect
however, the ACA anticipated this reaction.80
The ACA included Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) provisions to protect
consumers from increased premium hikes.1 The restriction on how i nsurers
can spend premium dollars is called an MLR.82 As of 2011, insurers must
devote a minimum percentage of premium revenue (at least eighty percent
in the individual and small-group market and eighty-five percent in the
large-group market), to medical claims and quality improvement, limiting
the amount that can be utilized for salaries, adninistrative efforts, marketing,
and insurer profits.83 Insurers must refund enrollees the shortfall if they fail
to satisfy these requirements." With this policy change, the ACA intends to
improve transparency for consumers and force insurers to increase value of
premium dollars.85
While ML R limitations may be seen as a driver for insurer consolidation,
they are also touted by some as a protection against preni um increases if the
proposed insurance mergers are allowed to move forward. 6 However, the
idea that M L R standards will prevent insurers from increasing consumer
premiums is not a realistic or logical defense for several reason. First, M L R
limitations do not apply to self-insured plans, where the employer or other
plan sponsor pays the cost of health benefits from its own assets.87 Even when
an insurer administers the self-funded plan on behalf of an employer, the
ML R standard does not apply. T his leaves a large portion of consumers-
more than half of private sector employee plans--exempt from ML R
limitations, allowing insurers to raise administrative fees on this population
to make up for the covered lives under MLR limitations. Second, capping
79. Martin Feldstein Editorial, Martin Feldstein: Obarmcare Could Raise Premiums and
the Ranks of the Uninsured, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-
dyn/content/article/2009/11/05/A R2009110504327.html.
80. Id.
81. ObarmCare Affects Health Insurance, supra note78.
82. Explaining Health Care Reform Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reformfact-sheet/explaining-health-care-
reform-medical-loss-ratio-nir/ [hereinafter KAISER FAM. FOUND.].
83. Id.
84. Dafny, supra note 22.
85. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 82.
86. Letter from Melinda Reid Hatton, Senior V ice President & General Counsel of the
Am Hospital Ass-n, to Ted Nickel, Commr of the Wisconsin Officer of the Comm-rs of Ins.,
& Katherine L. Wade, Comm-r of the State of Connecticut Ins. Dept (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2016/160223-let-consolidation.pdf [hereinafter
A HA Letter to State Ins. Comm-rs].
87. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. A HA L etter to State Ins. Comm-rs, supra note 86.
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what insurers are allowed to spend on non-direct health care does nothi ng to
protect consumers from the damage that will result from loss of competition
in the market.' F urthermore, there are concerns that M L R limitations could
be cleverly gamed in a way to relabel profits as costs or, similar to other
sections of the A CA, be repealed. 91
R equi rements for meeting ML R vary, but adj ustments are avai I able based
on the number of lives covered or an insurers special circumstances.92 Even
with these special allowances, the need for sufficient scale to comply with
MLR standards is likely to impede start-up providers, while the limitations
on administration costs as a percentage of revenues will likely encourage
further consolidation in an attempt to reduce administrative costs and
increase profits.' Many large insurers are already meeting MLR limits,
leaving room for price increases regardless of regulation.9
II. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INSURANCE MERGERS
Insurance company CE Os tout the benefits of the proposed mergers,
claining the transactions will allow insurers to 'deliver an acceleration of
innovative and affordable health and protection solutions_ 5 and capture large
90. Letter from the Am. Hospital Ass-n, to The Honorable William Baer (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2015/150805-let-acquisitions.pdf [hereinafter
AHA Letter to DOJ] (noting the AHA-s letter to DOJ regarding concerns and analysis on
proposed mergers).
91. Dafny, supra note 22.
92. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 82. An insurers medical loss ratio may be difficult
to estimate given that the ACA has changed an insurance comrpany-s traditional population
pool by mandating acceptance of individuals with pre-existing conditions. See ObarnCare
Affects Health Insurance, supra note 78; see also Mathews, supra note 76. An insurers
population pool will likely encompass a 'sicker population,_ making the pool of policy-
holders more expensive to insure. Jason Leopold, Documents Reveal Anthem Blue Cross
Manipulated Data to J ustify Massive Rate Hike, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 25, 2010, 6:37 PM),
http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/88224:documents-reveal-anthem-blue-cross-
manipulated-data-to-justify-massive-rate-hike. When an insurance company is forced to
provide more funds to care for policy-holders, its medical loss ratio will increase. Id. 'Even
if premium increases generate more revenue for a particular plan, if the pool of policyholders
for that plan becomes more expensive to insure, the medical loss ratio will appear higher.- Id.
93. Pope, supra note 30; see Mathews, supra note 76 (noting that many small insurance
startups were forced to shut down because of the ACA's implications and requirements on
insurance companies to provide Americans access to, but also low-costing, health insurance,
but larger health insurers were also to survive).
94. Dafny, supra note 22 (stating that '[a] recent study reports national MLRs for 2013
were 86 percent 84 percent, and 89 percent for the individual, small-group, and large-group
markets, respectively. These findings suggest there may be substantial room for profitable
merger-related price increases in the individual market in particular, notwithstanding the
minimum ML R _).
95. About the Transaction, ANTHEM, INC., http://betterhealthcaretogether.comabout-the-
transaction/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
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'synergy savings. _96 Looking past insurerspublic relations campaign, there
are real threats to consumers stemni ng from these proposed insurance
consolidations.
One area of concern is threats to healthcare providers. As insurance
consolidation sweeps through the healthcare industry, the already-limited
bargaining power that individual physicians had with health insurers will
inevitably diminish.' The number of independent physicians has dropped -
sixty to seventy percent of all physicians are now employed by a hospital or
system Increasing administrative and regulatory burdens make
independent practice less viable.' Insurer consolidation can effectively end
independent medical practices because smaller physician practices cannot
compete with the large insurers." This will likely force the small number of
remaining independent providers to merge with larger systems. To counter
the increased bargaining power of consolidated insurers, healthcare providers
will seek further consolidation.101
In addition to further driving provider consolidation, there isa real concern
that insurance mergers will lead to a reduction in provider payments.102
Studies demonstrate that in areas where there is an increase in insurance
market concentration, hospital prices are generally lower.103 The lower
hospital prices put provider viability at stake because they are often at the
mercy of those insurers with a great deal of market power. Both insurers and
96. Megan McArdle, No Wonder Insurers Want to Merge, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jul. 24,
2015, 2:06 PM), http://www.bloombergview.con-articies/2015-07-24/no-wonder-insurers-
want-to-merge.
97. Walker Ray & Tim Norbeck, When It Comes to Health Insurance Mergers, Bigger is
Not Going to Be Better, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2015, 1:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com'
sites/physiciansfoundation/2015/09/28/bigger-is-not-going-to-be-better/#79e82cfl603a.
98. Marion Callahan & Marissa Shoemaker Debree, Doctors Lookfor New Ways to Cope
with Health Care Changes, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.cor'
news/201 5/sep/5/doctors-look-for-new-ways-to-cope-with-health-care/?page=al l.
99. Ken Terry et al., Top 15 Challenges Facing Physicians in 2015, MED. ECON.
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.rmodernrredicine.conm-edical-economics/news/top-
15-challenges-facing-physicians-2015?page=full ('For some physicians, joining a large
hospital system offers a haven from the rising adninistrative burdens of staying independent
and from competitive pressures that can drive a small practice into insolvency._).
100. Scott Gottlieb, ObarmCare-s Threat to Private Practice, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 7,
2014, 5:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-gottl ieb-obamacares-threat-to-private-
practice-1417990367.
101. Herman, Potential Insurance Mergers, supra note 11.
102. Dafny, supra note 22; see Ray & Norbeck, supra note 97 (noting the 1999 merger
between Aetna and Prudential 'resulted in reduced payments to providers and no evidence
that those cost savings were passed on to consumers_).
103. Dafny, supra note 22 (measuring the correlation between hospital prices and
insurance consolidation with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is 'an imperfect
proxy for true competitiveness (the degree to which firms vie to serve consumers through
product design, price service, etc._).
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providers strive to acquire the size necessary to effectively negotiate within
the post-ACA -s hyper-regulatory environment but the implications of this
arms race are threatening to various stakeholders and the market as a
whole.1
A. Threats to Consumers
In addition to concerns relati ng to lower-provider reimbursement rates and
stand-alone practitioners, recent insurance mergers pose a threat to
consumers. While insurance companies argue consolidation will lead to more
efficiency and therefore decreased prices, this is only true if achieved cost
savings are passed through to consumers through lower preni uns and lower
out-of-pocket costs.10s When pressed in the Senate hearing last fall, neither
the CEO of Aetna nor Anthem could offer 'a single piece of evidence
demonstrating that health insurance mergers would create efficiencies, or that
they would pass along any savings to consumers. 106 There are serious
concerns that many of the benefits touted by insurers may not actually
materialize under the mergers and even if they do consumers will only see
marginal benefits.107
Instead of speculating on why prices may increase under insurance
mergers, one only needs to look to prior outcomes to ascertain that insurance
mergers did in fact raise premiums." In analyzing the 2008 merger of
UnitedHealth and Sierra and the 1999 merger of Aetna and Prudential, two
separate studies confirmed that insurers raised consumers- premiums post-
merger. 109 The retrospective study of Aetna-Prudential, conducted by
Leemore Dafny, a health econonist at Northwestern University and a former
regulator at the Federal Trade Commission, concluded that 'health insurer
104. Scott W. Atlas, Under Obarncare, Hospitals Merge, Doctors Merge, and Patients
Pay More for Less, NAT L REV. (Nov. 25, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.comf
arti cl e/427601 /obarmacare-health-care-costs-consurmer-choice-consolidation.
105. Michael J. McCue & Mark Hall, What-s Behind Health Insurance Rate Increases?
An Examination of What Insurers Reported to the Federal Government in 2012-2013,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.comrmonwealthfund.org/publications/
issue-bri efs/201 3/dec/health-insurance-rate-increases.
106. David Balto, Health Insurance Mergers Fact Check: Why Consurers Will Lose,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-balto/health-
insurance-mergers b_8521708.htnl; cf. Dafny, supra note 22 (noting that studies of hospital
pricing based on geographic areas tend to show that hospital prices are lower in geographic
areas with higher levels of insurance market concentration).
107. Paul von Ebers, Mega Health Insurance Mergers: Is Bigger Really Better?, HEALTH
AFF. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/01/22/rega-health-insurance-
mergers-is-bigger-really-better/.
108. Balto, supra note 106.
109. Id.
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mergers rarely, if ever, lead to lower premiums for consumers._110 Dafny
further established that the Aetna-Prudential deal 'mostly translated into
bulked-up negotiating power over hospitals and doctors. " The increase in
cost could bejustifiable if services or products significantly improve, butthe
concern is that these proposed mergers will increase costs without a
correlating increase in efficiency or quality.
Consolidation may also have a much larger economic impact on
consumers beyond just preniums. Dafny-s post-merger Aetna-Prudential
study also found a reduction in wages and healthcare employment in the areas
where the two insurers held significant market power. 112
B. Lack of Competition
While provider consolidation is a substantial factor in pushing insurers to
gain additional market power, some argue that the insurance mergers are a
reaction to the A CA." Wharton Professor of H ealthcare Management, Mark
Pauly, believes the insurance mergers are a way for insurers to fight back
against the competition mandated through the A CA.114
T his is a kind of counterattack on the part of insurers saying, well, if you-re
going to try to stimulate competition, we-re going to counteract by
reducing the number of competitors, so at least we won't have to worry
about as many competitors stabbing us in the back by cutting prices if we
can buy them up or acquire them.11s
T he A CA -created exchanges allow consumers to openly compare insurers,
encouraging insurers who vie for this population-s premiums to provide
competitive options in not only price but also in value. 16 Seen as an attempt
to combat this designed competition, the insurance i ndustry-s proposed
mergers have sparked increased criticism. For instance, the American
Medical Association (AMA) openly expressed criticism of the proposed
110. Bob Herman, Senators Grill CEOs of Aetna, Anthem Over Comrpetitive Effects of
Deals, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.rmodernhealthcare.com
article/20150922/NEWS/150929962 [hereinafter Herman, Senators Grill CEOs].
111. Id.
112. D afny, supra note 22.
113. Sarah Ferris, GOP Blames ObarmCare for Health Insurance Merger-Mania, THE
HILL U uly 8, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com'policy/healthcare/2471 61-gop-pounces-on-
health-i nsurance-merger-mani a.
114. What-s Driving Health Insurers- Merger Mania?: Mark Pauly Discusses Proposed
Health Care Insurance Company Mergers, WHARTON PODCAST (une 23, 2015),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whats-driving-health-insurers-rmerger-mania'
[hereinafter WHARTON PODCAST].
115. Id.
116 Cusano& Lucia, supra note 25.
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insurance mega-mergers.117 The A MA fears the proposed insurance mergers
'would end competition in key markets and erode patient care. 1" The
decline in competition not only has the potential to impact the quality of care
butthe cost implications associated with the lack of competition also threaten
the health care industry on a larger scale.
TheACA -s effectiveness in achieving high-quality, low-cost care is based
on availability of competition in the market and collective bargaining
amongst providers and payors.119 The intent and main provisions of the
ACA hinge on 'well-functioning competitive markets in order to provide
the intended benefits to consumers. 120 There are several tools for
assessing the concentration of a market, and the potential effects of a
merger. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is one such measure that
is commonly used to assess market concentration. 121 Markets that are less
concentrated are more competitive.122 In looking at the impact of
competition on the individual exchange markets, a 2014 study found that
after a large national insurer decided not to participate, preniums increased
more than five percent that year.123 Another study found that having one
additional insurer in a geographic area could save individuals nearly $500 in
premi uns per person. 124 The A MA found that the current health insurance
market was deemed as 'highly concentrated_ in nearly seventy-five percent
of U.S. metropolitan areas based on federal guidelines used to assess market
competition.125 These mergers could reduce competition in at least 817
relevant geographic markets, serving forty-five million consumers. 126
117. Ana Radelat, AMA AsksJ ustice Department to Block Aetna-Hurnna, Anthem-Cigna
Mergers, CT MIRROR (Nov. 12, 2015), http://ctrirror.org/2015/11/12/ama-asks-justice-
departrment-to-block-aetna-humana-anthem-cigna- mergers/.
118. Id.
119. D afny, supra note 22.
120. Julie Brill, Com-petition in Health Care Markets, HEALTH AFF. (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/26/competition-in-health-care-markets/.
121. U.S. DEP-T. OF Jus., Herfindahl-Hirschrmn Index, (July 29, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index.
122. Mary Mahon, New Report: Little or No Cormpetition in Medicare Advantage
Insurance Markets in 97% of U.S. Counties, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.comrmonwealthfund.org/publications/press-releases/2015/aug/Iittle-comrpetition-
in-rmedicare-advantage.
123. Leemore Dafny et al., More Insurers, Lower Premums: Evidence from Initial
Pricing in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, AM.J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 53-81 (2015).
124. Michael J. Dickstein et al., The Impact of Market Size and Com-position on Health
Insurance Preiums: Evidencefromthe FirstYear oftheAffordable CareAct, 105AM. ECON.
REV. 120 (May 2015).
125. Courtney Baird, Top Healthcare Stories for 2016: Insurance Company Mergers,
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.ced.org/blog/entry/top-healthcare-
stories-for-2016-insurance-company- mergers.
126. AHA Letter to DOJ, supra note 90.
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In response to concerns that the mergers will lead to lack of competition,
insurers argue those concerns will be offset by new entrants into the market.
CE Os of maj or insurers argue new insurers are entering the market and
creating new competition. 127 In reality, smaller companies wanting to play
will likely be unable to compete with the size, scope, and technology of the
mega-insurers, which will further reduce existing competition and act as a
barrier for new insurers to enter the market. We are already seeing a reduction
in plan offerings in 2016, where there will be twenty-five percent fewer plans
available than in 2015 and forty percent fewer preferred provider
organization plans available.128
The health insurance market has been labeled one of the most difficult
markets to enter. 129 The ACA incentivized the participation of nonprofit
insurance co-operatives known as Consumer Operated and Oriented Plans
(CO-OP) through subsidized loans.130 High capital requirements and
burdensome tasks of building provider networks, however, have discouraged
new health plans from entering into the private health insurance market131
Instead, health plans are entering into the private health insurance market
through acquisition.132 Yet many new health plans, including those
incentivized under the ACA, specifically CO-OPs, have struggled and
closed.133 This is primarily because new companies face substantial
challenges associated with the time and resources required to negotiate
competitive reimbursement rates, build relationships with provider networks,
and establish a reputation with consumers. 134 Furthermore, MLR constraints
will limit the amount a new insurer can spend on marketing to providers,
employers, and consumers. In contrast, mega-insurers will have the
economies of scale in all of these areas and more. 13 s
C. Consolidation-s Impact on the Medicare Advantage Plan Market
Medicare Advantage was created in the 1970s to allow Medicare
beneficiaries to receive Medicare benefits through private health plans.136
127. Robert Pear, Health Insurers Seeking Mergers Play Down Antitrust Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com2015/09/23/business/aetna-anthem-
congress-health-insurers- mergers. htni?_ r= 1.
128. Balto, supra note 106.
129. H errnan, Senators Grill CE Os, supra note 110.
130. D afny et al., supra note 123, at 1.
131. D afny, supra note 22.
132. Id.
133. H errnan, Senators Grill CE Os, supra note 110.
134. D afny et al., supra note 123.
135. Id.
136. Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 29, 2015),
http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage/.
2016 115
18
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol25/iss2/5
Annals of Health Law
Nearly twenty-two million Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in
government-financed private plans, collectively known as Medicare
Advantage.137 There are serious concerns that the proposed insurance
mergers would extremely consolidate an already concentrated Medicare
Advantage Plans market In August 2015, the Commonwealth Fund
published a study finding that ni nety-seven percent of Medicare A dvantage
markets are already highly concentrated. 13 The study concluded that in two-
thirds of the 100 countries with the highest Medicare beneficiaries, insurer
market power was concentrated to just three national insurers. 139
Humana currently serves over three million Medicare beneficiaries.140
Kaiser Fanily Foundation found that if Aetna and Humana are allowed to
merge, the new company would become the largest Medicare Advantage
i nsurer, coveri ng over one quarter of M edi care Advantage enroll ees.14 1 These
insurers Iooki ng to merge al ready have dominance over M edi care Advantage
plans, but that dominance will only grow under the proposed merger. For
example, if Aetna goes through with purchasing Humana, the newly-created
company will serve ninety percent of Kansas Medicare Advantage
patients.142
T he A CA and Medicare Advantage only work with competition. T he lack
of competition that stems from consolidation could force those healthcare
plans to become unaffordable. 143 While insurance companies argue mergers
will result in 'no material change to competition in market _11 providers are
asking the Department of j ustice (DOJ) to heavily scrutinize the effect
consolidations would have on Medicare Advantage providers. 145 The
American Hospital Association (AHA) argues these consolidations trigger
137. D afny, supra note 22.
138. Brian Biles et al., Competition Among Medicare-s Private Health Plans: Does It
Really Exist?, 25 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 4 (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.comrmon
wealthfund.org/-/media/files/publicationsfissue-brief/2015/aug/1832_biles_
competition medicare-private plans i bv2.pdf.
139. Id at 1.
140. Robert Cyran, Regulatory Hurdles to Health Insurance Mergers, N.Y. TIMES
(July 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com2015/09/23/business/aetna-anthem-congress-
health-i nsurers-mergers.html?_ r-0.
141. Gretchen Jacobson et al., Data Note: Medicare Advantage Plan by Firm 2015,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. U uly 14, 2015), http://kff.org/rredicarelissue-brief/data-note-m-edicare-
advantage- enrol I ment- by-fi rm- 2015/.
142. Cyran, supra note 140.
143. Robert I. Field et al., What Do Health Insurance Mergers Mean for You?,
PHILLY.COM (Sept. 17, 2015, 12:05 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/health-
cents/What-do-health-insurance-mergers- mean-for-you. htnl.
144. Robert Pear, supra note 127 (quoting Congressional testimony of CEO of Humana
describing company as a 'large Medicare company_ serving over three illion Medicare
beneficiaries).
145. A HA Letter to DOJ, supra note 90.
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sincere concerns over the preservation of the benefits of competition for
beneficiaries that the program was designed to bring. 146
III. EVALUATING MERGER SUCCESS UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the
DOJ share responsibility at the federal level for antitrust regulation and
enforcement. 147 State attorneys general and insurance commissioners are also
charged with enforcement of antitrust laws and the evaluation of potential
antitrust violations.148 Healthcare consolidation has become a focus of
antitrust scrutiny, with pressure coming from both the FTC and DOJ in recent
years.14 9 Antitrust laws were created to protect consumers through the
mechanisms of competition in the marketplace.1s0 The collection of antitrust
laws create a framework to ensure that strong incentives exist for businesses
to keep quality up and prices down, while operating efficiently.s1
A. Antitrust Laws
Traditionally, antitrust scrutiny has focused on provider and
pharmaceutical mergers, particularly given the insurance industry s antitrust
exemption through the McCarran-Ferguson Act.152 T he McCarran-Ferguson
Act was passed in 1945 as a response to a Supreme Court ruling1ss finding
that the business of insurance fell within interstate commerce and was
146. Id.
147. FED. TRADE COMM-N, GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS: THE ENFORCERS, https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/com-petition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015) [hereinafter FTC, THE ENFORCERS].
148. Id.
149. Richard B. Benenson& KerryJ. LeMonte, FTCs Focus on Healthcare Mergers and
Consolidation, 45 Colo. Lawyer (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.bhfs.com/Templates/
media/files/news/CoLawyer2_1_16.pdf; Joe Carlson, Report Shows FTC's Focus on
Healthcare, MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 13, 2012), http://www.rmodernhealthcare.com'
article/20120613/NEWS/306139960.
150. The Sherman Act was the first measure passed by Congress to prohibit monopolies
in interstate commerce and passed in response to public opposition to monopolies formed
following the Civil War. The Act passed almost unanimously with a 51-1 vote in Senate and
unanimous vote in the House. Sheran Antitrust Act of 1890, Soc'Y FOR HUMAN RES.,
https://www.shrmorg/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguidanc/pag
es/shermananti-trustactofl 890.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
151. FTC,THE ENFORCERS, supra note 147.
152. 15 U.S.C. f1 1011 etseq.
153. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass-n, 322 U.S. 533(1944) (members
of an insurance association were indicted on charges of violating the Sherman Act by fixing
rates and monopolizing the insurance business in a multiple states; lower court held the
business of insurance was not commerce but on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed holding
that the insurance industry was an appropriate subject for federal regulation under commerce
clause and therefore subject to Sherman Act).
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therefore subject to federal regulation under federal antitrust laws.154 T he Act
exempts from federal antitrust laws the 'business of insurance,_ including
health insurance, to the extent that it is regulated by state law.1 ss In doing so,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act confirmed states- authority to regulate and tax
insurance. This is not a blanket exemption from federal antitrust law;
activities are only exempt from federal regulation if they meet three
requirements: 1) the activity falls within 'business of insurance,_ 2) the
activity is regulated by state law, and 3) the activity in question does not
involve actions or agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimidate.1 6 If an
activity is found to be included in the 'business of insurance, _ but not
regulated by state law, then the activity is subject to regulation under federal
antitrust laws.157
Three main federal laws govern antitrust 1) the Sherman Act,158 2) the
Federal Trade Comnission Act,15  and 3) the Clayton Act. 1  In addition to
federal law, most states have passed antitrust state statutes that often mirror
federal language. 161
The Sherman Act prohibits 'every contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade,_ and any 'monopolization, attempted monopolization, or
conspiracy or combination to monopolize. _162 In its application, the Sherman
Act prohibits both unreasonable restraints of trade as well as blatant
arrangements between competing individuals to pricefix or unfairly alter the
market.163 Violations occur as a result of both case-by-case analyses of what
constitutes unreasonable restraints of trade and blatant 'per se_ violations."
154. Michael Cowie, HealthInsuranceand Federal Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Recent
Congressional Action, ANTITRUST SOURCE, AM. BAR Ass-N 1, 2 (Dec. 2009), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publ ishi ng/antitrust-source/Dec09_Cowiel 21 7f.authchec
kdampdf.
155. Cowie, supra note 154, at7. Courts analyze three factors in determining whether a
practice constitutes the 'business of insurance_: (1) whether the practice has the effect of
transferring a policyholders risk, (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between insurer and policyholder, and (3) whether the practice is linited to
entities within the insurance industry. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129
(1982); Cowie, supra note 154, at 2.
156. 15 U.S.C. f1 1011 -1015 (2001).
157. Cowie, supra note 154, at l.
158. 15 U.S.C.f 1 -2 (2013).
159. 15 U.S.C. f 45(a)(1) (2010).
160. 15 U.S.C. f1 12-27 (2000).
161. See, e.g., WASH. STATE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS,
http://www.atg.wa.gov/antitrustguide.aspx (last visited A pr. 7, 2016).
162. FED. TRADE COMM-N, GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS: THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws
(last visited Mar. 28, 2016) [hereinafter FTC, GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS].
163. Id.
164. Id.
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A 'per se violation is deemed to be so harmful, it is always found to be a
violation and no justifications or defenses are allowed.16 s Violations of the
Sherman Act can carry both civil and crini nal liability.166 T he Supreme Court
has interpreted that all violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC
A ct.167
The FTC Act created the FTC and expanded on the Sherman Act,
capturing within its scope certain practices that may harm competition but
were not found in violation of the Sherman Act.16 The FTC Act prohibits
'unfair methods of competition_ and 'unfair or deceptive acts or
practices._169
The Clayton Act further addresses practices not explicitly prohibited by
the Sherman Act, including mergers.170 Mergers tend to lead to a reduction
in competition,171 a trend that inevitably catches the eyes of antitrust
regulators.172 Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act applies to mergers,
acquisitions, and joint ventures." Under this section, mergers are unlawful
when the effect 'may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly. _174 This section allows for a preemptive challenge to a
merger through injunction. Proof of actual anticompetitive practices is
165. Id.; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST RESOURCE MANUAL: IDENTIFYING,
DETECTING AND PROVING PER SE VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT, https://www.justice.gov/
usam/anti trust- resource-manual-6-se-vi ol ati ons-sherman-act (last vi sited Mar. 28, 2016)
('The most frequent violations of the Sherman Act are price fixing and bid rigging, both of
which are usually prosecuted as criminal violations. ).
166. FTC, GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 162.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. 'Unfair_ practices are defined as those that 'cause[] or [are] likely to
cause substantial iniury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.-
15 U.S.C.f 45(n) (2010).
170. FTC, GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 162.
171. But cf. Editorial, The Case for Bigger Health Insurers, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 8,
2015 12:00 AM), http://www.bloom-bergview.comarticles/2015-07-08/the-case-for-bigger-
health-insurers (arguing consolidation among insurers may be necessary to keep market
competitive in light of already established provider consolidation); but cf. Toby Singer, Pro-
Competitive Benefits of Hospital Mergers, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.hhnrmag.comarticles/5212-the-pro-competitive-benefits-of-hospital-mergers
(arguing mergers offer hospitals the potential to remain competitive in the rapidly changing
field of health care).
172. Ayla Ellison, 5 Things to Know about the Merger of Health Systems and Insurance
Providers, BECKER-S HOSP. REV. (June 6, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com
hospital-transactions-and-val uation/5-thi ngs-to-know-about-the-merger-of-health-systems-
and-insurance-providers.html.
173. Summary of Section 7 Clayton Antitrust Act, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (Oct. 11,
2013), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Section%207.pdf [hereinafter AM.
ANTITRUST INST.].
174. Id.
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unnecessary to establish a Section 7 violation; the challenging entity only
needs to make a prediction based on current facts that anticompetitive effects
will result from the transaction and seek judicial approval to block the
merger.s17 A plaintiff seeking to enjoin a merger must establish a prima facie
case showing the merger would 'produce an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and result in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market. 176 The Supreme Court has held that defining the
relevant geographic and product markets is essential to a Section 7 claim"
Once established, there is a presumption of illegality,178 but the defendant
may rebut the presumption179 with contradictory data and market trends or
raise a defense.1s0
Unlike other parts of the Clayton Act, Section 7 is intended to be 'forward-
looking_ and to prevent conditions from occurring that would subject
consumers to unchallenged price increases.' The conditions that Section 7
of the Clayton Act intends to thwart include lower-quality plans, higher
premiums, and limited provider access. 18 2
In 1976, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ('HSR Act_) amended the Clayton
Act18 3 The HSR Act outlines the process of federal pre-notification and
review for large mergers or acquisitions." The HSR Act established waiting
periods for regulatory review before a merger or acquisition could be
175. Hosp. Corp. ofAm. v. F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1389(7th Cir. 1986) (finding 'Section
7 does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition has caused higher prices in the
affected market. All that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable danger of such
consequences in the future. _).
176. United States v. Phila. Nati Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363(1963).
177. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)
('Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of
the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen
competition :within the area of effective competition.).
178. FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991).
179. Id. at 1218 ('To rebut this presumption, the defendant must produce evidence that
'show[s] that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the acquisition[:s]
probable effect[ ] on competition_ in the relevant market. _).
180. Two defenses include the 'failing firm_ defense and the 'state action_ defense. The
failing firm defense is applied only if it can be proven by the defendant that the company
acquiring the failing company is the only possible purchaser. Citizen Pub. Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). The state action defense provides antitrust immunity where
a state has affirmatively authorized the alleged anticompetitive conduct. FTC v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992) ('First, the challenged restraint must be one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; second, the policy must be actively
supervised by the State itself. _).
181. Joe Infantino, Under Review: How DOJ, FTC Decide Whether to OK Health
Insurance Mergers, CALIF. HEALTHLINE (Dec. 16, 2015), http://californiahealthline.org/
news/under-revi ew-how-doj-ftc-deci de-whether-to-ok- health-insurance- rmergers/.
182. Infanti no, supra note 181.
183. 15U.S.C.I 18a(1976).
184. Id.
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completed"1 -- alleviating the need for expensive and time-consuming
divestures' 6 after an anti-competitive merger has already gone through.187
Prior to the HSR Act, the FTC lacked authority to require waiting periods.',
If the FTC learned of a proposed transaction, it was difficult to gather and
revi ew information in a timely manner and near impossible to have enough
informati on to file a preliminary inj unction to block the deal. 18
The HSR Act created notification thresholds--when a merger or
acquisition exceeds a certain monetary value, the companies involved must
notify federal authorities of the proposed actions and file for antitrust
approval.190 Once an approval request is filed, the merger is suspended for
thirty days to allow the FTC and DOJ to review the proposed merger and
determine if it should go forward or if more information is needed.191 If more
informati on is needed, the FT C asks the parties for a preliminary revi ew. 192
The agency assigned 93 to the preliminary review has thirty days from the
185. Id.
186. William Baer, Former Dir, Fed. Trade Comm-n, Address at 3 5 th Annual Corporate
Counsel Institute: Reflections on 20 Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act (Oct. 31, 1996), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1996/10/reflections-20-
years- merger-enforcement- under-hart-scott- rodi no-act#N_21 (prior to HSR, post-merger
acquisition cases took on average five to six years to go from acquisition to divestiture
allowing the parties during that timeframe to retain illegal profits and continue their
anti competitive effects on the marketplace, injuring both consumers and competitors).
187. Id. (citing Assistant Attorney General Kauper-s testimony that intent behind HSR
Acts premerger notification 'will prevent the consummation of so-called:midnight- mergers
designed to subvert the Department-s authority to seek preliminary relief_).
188. Id.
189. Id. ('One study found that in the sixteen-year period from 1956 to 1971, the
government filed 167 merger challenges, but moved for a preliminary injunction in only 50 of
them. The data suggest that closeto 70% of the problematic mergers were not detected in time
to seek preliminary relief. _.
190. FED. TRADE COMM-N, FTC ANNOUNCES NEW CLAYTON ACT MONETARY
THRESHOLDS FOR 2016 (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2016/01 /ftc-announces-new-cl ayton-act-rmonetary-threshol ds-2016 (The FTC revises HSR
Act thresholds annually, the threshold for reporting proposed mergers and acquisitions was
$76.3 million in 2015 and will increase to $78.2 million for 2016).
191. Infantino, supra note 181.
192. FED. TRADE COMM-N, GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS: PREMERGER NOTIFICATION AND
THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/mergers/premerger-notification-and-merger (last visited Mar. 28, 2016)
[hereinafter FTC, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION]; see Scott P. Perlman, Mayer Brown LLP,
Address at the Post Merger Integration Conference: Overview of the Merger Review Process
(June 25, 2008), https://www.mayerbrown.com/publicdocs/MergerReviewProcess.pdf
(noting that one in five filings result in a preliminary investigation; preliminary investigations
request information from parties including but not limited to interviews with company
executives, interviews with top customers, strategic and marketing plans, profit and loss
reports and manufacturing capabilities).
193. Parties file with both the FTC and DOJ, but generally only one agency reviews the
proposed merger. FTC, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION, supra note 192. Staff from both agencies
consult and the matter is 'cleared_ to one agency for review, known as the
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time all requested information is received to evaluate; if the thirty-day period
expires or is terminated by the agency, the deal is allowed to move forward.19
If the proposal raises serious concerns regarding competition, the reviewing
agency asks for an extended review as a 'second request. _19 A majority of
the proposed deals reviewed by the FTC and DOJ are allowed to proceed
after the preliminary revi ew. 196 When a second request is initiated, companies
are compelled to provide all information requested by the agencies. 19 When
all i nformati on requested has been provided, the agency has thirty days to
review the information and make a decision on how to move forward.19 After
the second request federal regulators have three options: (1) close the
investigation and allow the merger to move forward; (2) request that the filing
companies to divest certain aspects of business before moving forward; or
(3) file an injunction in federal court to block the deal. 1
States also play an important role in antitrust enforcement. In their role as
the chief regulator for the insurance industry, almost every state has
implemented versions of the federal antitrust laws. 20 0 As the state-s chief
legal counsel, a state-s attorney general (AG) plays an important role in
antitrust law enforcement AGs have the ability to bring antitrust suits on
behalf of individual citizens in a state or on behalf of the state as a
purchaser.201 An AG may bring an action to enforce the state's own antitrust
laws and may join with federal investigators in anti trust reviews. 202 Particular
to health insurance mergers, state insurance commissioners play an important
role in review and approval. Insurance comnissioners are in a unique
position to analyze the health insurance market in their state and consider
additional factors that may impact the market specific to their state, outside
'clearance process._ Id.
194. Perlman, supra note 192.
195. FED. TRADE COMM N, MERGER REVIEW, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-
resources/mergers-and-competiti on/merger-review (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) [hereinafter
FTC, MERGER REVIEW].
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. FTC, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION, supra note 192.
199. FTC, MERGER REVIEW, supra note 195.
200. FTC, GUIDE To ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 162.
201. FTC,THE ENFORCERS, supra note 147.
202. Id.; David Hatch, Texas Leads Antirust Fight Against Google, GOVERNING MAG.
(Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.governing.com/blogsview/gov-texas-leads-antitrust-fight-against-
google.htnl (noting the Texas Attorney General s conduction of formal antitrust review of
Google); Joel Brinkley, U.S. v. Microsoft: the Overview, U.S. J udge Says Microsoft Violated
Antitrust Laws with Predatory Behaviors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2000), http://www.nytirmes.
com/2000/04/04/busi ness/us-vs-microsoft-overview-us-judge-says-microsoft-violated-
antitrust-laws-with.htni?pagewanted=all (noting that in 1998, nineteen State Attorney
Generals joined the DOJ in suing Microsoft alleging violation of federal antitrust laws through
predatory and anticompetitive behavior).
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typical antitrust analysis. 2 03 Furthermore, a commissioners review is
independent and therefore not required to follow reviews completed by other
regulators.204
B. Where Proposed Deals Stand Now
Currently, the DOJ is simultaneously reviewing the proposed Anthem-
Cigna and Aetna-Humana mergers and evaluating the interaction of the
two.2 05 State attorneys general and state insurance commissioners have the
ability to evaluate and investigate mergers. Fifteen state attorneys general
have joined the DOJ s investigation of both Aetna-Humana and Anthem-
Cigna proposed mergers. 206 In addition to the DOJ and states- attorneys
general, state insurance commissioners within jurisdictions where the parties
do business will investigate and evaluate the mergers, taking into account
local competition and whether the mergers will benefit consumers. 207
Anthem-Cigna and Aetna-Humana have already been asked to provide
additional information in a 'second request and neither deal is expected to
receive clearance or a final decision for at least a year.208 Second requests are
not common; they are only issued in two to four percent of HSR filings20
and elicit intense lIevels of scrutiny.210 If antitrust issues are identified, federal
regulators may require certain aspects of the insurers to be divested before
they are allowed to move forward with a merger, generally in overlapping
business interests.211 For example, in 2012, federal regulators required
Anthem to disassociate itself of certain operations before moving forward
with its acquisition ofAmerigroup. 212 This may not be a realistic fix because
both groups have significant overlapping business interests as maj or insurers
203. Alfred Gilchrist Insurance-Industry-Proposed Mergers: Colorado Regulators Okay
Aetna-Hurmna Merger Without Notice, COLORADO MED. SocY (Jan. 1, 2016, 12:16 PM),
http://www.cms.org/site/print/insurance-industry-proposed-meorgers-colorado-regulators-
okay-aetna-humana-m.
204. Id.
205. Leslie Small, A Glimpse into the DOJ -s Review of Health Insurer Mega-Mergers,
FIERCE HEALTH PAY ER (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.fiercehealthpayer.comstory/glimpse-dojs-
review-health-i nsurer-mega-mergers/201 6-03-11.
206. Goliya supra note 9.
207. Cyran, supra note 140.
208. Infanti no, supra note 181.
209. Perlman, supra note 192.
210. In second requests agencies can ask for any and all data and documents relating to
the proposed transaction, businesses of the parties, competition in the current market and
competitive effects of the merger. FTC, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION, supra note 192. The
agency rmay also conduct informal interviews or sworn testimony of relevant employees,
personnel or others with knowledge of the industry. Id.
211. FTC, Merger Review, supra note 195.
212. Cyran, supra note 140.
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with similar products. 2 13 If insurers refuse to change the identified operations
of concern, federal regulators could file for a preliminary inj unction in federal
court to block the deal. 214
In evaluating the mergers, the DOJ and FTC establish product and
geographic markets for both proposals. They evaluate the concentration of
the defined markets, the conpetitive effect of the mergers, and the likelihood
of new entrants into the market. 2 15 The analysis considers both pro-
competitive effects as well as anti-competitive effects.216 Pro-competitive
effects include potential efficiencies obtained through the acquisition or
increased ability to offer new or improved products. A nti-competitive effects
include reduction in price competition potentially leading to higher prices,
reduction in quality or increased barriers to new entrants into the market
Both pro-competitive effects and anti-competitive effects will aid in
establishing the merger impact on the market
C. Impact of Proposed Mergers
The A meri can Academ-y of Family Practitioners (AA FP), the A MA, and
the AHA have petitioned the DOJ to block the pending deals. 217 Providers
argue these proposed mergers will 'impair access, affordability and
innovation in the sell-side market for health insurance, and, on the buy side,
will deprive physicians of the ability to negotiate competitive health insurer
contract terms in markets around the country, - leading to detrimental results
for consumers.218 Independent hospitals and physician groups already have
limited negotiating lIeverage with insurers. For those who choose to remain
independent, they are often forced to refuse contracts with insurers, leaving
patients with out-of-network medical bills or forced to find new in-network
providers. 219
In contrast, some argue that providers have been consolidating for years
and have the upper hand; therefore, to sustain competition in the market,
these mergers should go forward. 220 As providers consolidated to meet
213. Infanti no, supra note 181.
214. Id.
215. DEPT OF JUSTICE & FTC, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN
HEALTH CARE (Aug. 1996), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/com-petition-
poli cy-gui dance/staterments_ ofantitrustenforcement_ pol i cy i n health care august
1996.pdf [hereinafter DOJ & FTC, STATEMENTS].
216. Id.
217. Jeffrey Young, Health Insurance Mega-Mergers Attract Powerful E nerry,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/health-insurance-
mega-mergers-attract-powerful-enemryrus_5643a001e4b0603773477931.
218. Id.
219. Herrman, Providers Fear, supra note 75.
220. Editorial, The Case for Bigger Health Insurers, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 8, 2015
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coordinated care efforts, they also gained market share and negotiation power
along the way, forcing insurers to raise rates that get passed onto
consumers.221
While providers argue only anti-competitive effects, the proposed mergers
will carry multiple pro-competitive effects. Insurers argue the mergers will
increase efficiency.222 Aetna has already publicly claimed it can identify
$1.25 billion in 'synergy opportunit[ies] _223 and increased operating
efficiencies in the Humana acquisition. Both proposed mergers will increase
payor scale to negotiate lower reimbursement rates, ultimately saving money
for the systems and li kely resulti ng in lower premiums charged to consumers.
Furthermore, these mergers will allow the newly merged insurance
companies to innovate care delivery.224 U HG, the nation s largest insurer,225
recently announced a new plan consisting of primary care clinics in Atlanta
and Chicago, focused on preventive care, offering unlimited free doctor
visits, around-the-clock access, personalized health coaches, and mental
health treatment. 226 These new models are risky considering UHG s 2015
losses, but U HG s size, scope, and resources allow them to take these types
of risks and implement innovative care models that will benefit consumers
and could ultimately cut care costs dramatically.227 In evaluating these
proposed insurance mergers, a significant pro-competitive effect of these
mergers will be the ability to craft inventive high-quality, low-cost consumer-
focused care models, following the lead of UHG.
Despite public scrutiny, both proposed mergers are receiving continuous
approval from state regulators.228 T his state approval speaks to the idea that
health care is inherently local and if state regulators, looking at their market
as a whole, do not have concerns, it may signify that the mergers will
inevitably go through, likely with appropriate divestitures. Although these
12:00 AM), http://www.bloombergview.comarticles/2015-07-08/the-case-for-bigger-health-
insurers.
221. Id.
222. Aetna, supra note 2.
223. Id.
224. E bers, supra note 107.
225. Nathan Bormey & Jayne OTonnell, UnitedHealth Warns It May Exit Obarncare
Plans, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2015, 10:54 A M), http:/ANww.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/
11/1 9/unitedhealth-group-earni ngs-downgrade-obamacare-affordabl e-care-act/76040322/.
226. Phil Galewitz, UnitedHealth Tries Boutique-Style Health Plan, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Apr. 4, 2016), http://khn.org/news/unitedhealth-tries-boutique-style-health-plan/.
227. Id.
228. See Goliya, supra note9; see Gilchrist, supra note203(notingColorado Department
of Insurances recent January approval of Aetna-Hurmana merger). Anthems acquisition of
Cigna has been approved in Alabama, Tennessee, Nevada and Montana, leaving twenty-two
states and the DOJ left to review Anthems deal. Bertha Coombs, Insurance Deal Win Over
States, Feds Still in Doubt, CNBC (Feb. 16, 2016, 6:32 PM), http://www.cnbc.com'
2016/02/1 6i nsurance-deal s-wi n-over-states-but-feds-sti Il-in-doubt. html.
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mergers could bring a needed counterbalance to existing provider dominion
in certain geographic areas, providers are unlikely to concede to 'the
balance,_ forcing the continuation of the arms race for control, negotiation
power, and damaging consumer effects.229
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Aligning Incentives
Health insurance companies have emphasized consolidation as a way to
achieve better quality and lower costs within the modern health care delivery
system. 230 The ACA solidified the industry-s goals of high-quality and low-
costs, but these goals have always been central to the mission of health
insurance companies.231 Insurance companies have sought to encourage
higher-quality care as a result of their recognition that high-quality care likely
leads to a decrease in pricy hospital stays and subsequent readmissions,
resulting in lower healthcare costs overall. Healthcare providers have always
strived to deliver high-quality health care, but providers have not traditionally
been financially incentivized to deliver health care at both the highest quality
and the lowest cost.23 2
Under the long-standing fee-for-service model, providers are financially
incentivized to produce a higher volume of healthcare services, instead of at
a higher value.233 In the traditional fee-for-service payment model, insurers
reimburse providers for each individual unit of healthcare services delivered
to a patient.2 34 Through this reimbursement model, the more services
229. Erin Marshall, Health Insurance Mega-Mergers May Go Through, But Only In
Certain Markets BECKER-s Hosp. REV. (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.beckers
hospital revi ew.com/payer-i ssues/health-i nsurer-mega-mergers- may-go-through-but-only-in-
certain-markets. htnl.
230. Sternberg, supra note 4.
231. See Steve Lamb, Building Successful Payer-Provider Partnerships for Cost
Reduction, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE (Nov. 11, 2014), http://rmnagedhealthcare
executive. modernmedici ne.com/managed-healthcare-executive/news/bui Iding-successful-
payer-provider-partnerships-cost-reduction (noting that payors want to control costs up front
and promote proactive programs that manage chronic care and reduce hospital readissions).
232. See generally Erin E. Dine, Money Will Likely Be the Carrot, But What Stick Will
Keep ACOs Accountable?, 47 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1377 (2016) (proposing another incentive
model that can effectively encourage providers to participate in coordinated care models by
financially incentivizing providers through the Medicare Shared Savings Programto produce
low-cost care and through implementing a group medical malpractice insurance model where
providers will share in the savings for a reduction in the amount of medical malpractice claims
to incentivize the delivery of high-quality care).
233. Claire Batholome, Leveraging Our Strengths: Reinforcing Pay-for-Performance
Programs as the Solution for Defensive Medicine, 4J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 333, 340
(2008).
234. Mark W. Friedberg et al., Effects of Health Care Paymnt Models on Physician
Practice in the United States, RAND CORP. 10(2015), http://www.rand.org/content/damrand/
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provided, the more reimbursement a provider receives from the insurer.235
By incentivizing providers to over-prescribe and over-treat, the fee-for-
service reimbursement model has resulted in high-cost patient health care.236
This impersonal health care can drive up costs for both patient-consumrers
and insurers.237 Correspondingly, patients may also feel the fee-for-service
model-s negative financial implications through their health insurance
premi urns.
The insurer, rather than the provider, bears the financial responsibility for
the costs associated with each unit of healthcare services.238 The fee-for-
service reimbursement model incentivizes providers to order more tests,
possibly provide unnecessary treatment and keep hospital beds full. In
contrast, payors profit from not paying out their premium revenues for
medical services, and ultimately prefer empty hospital beds. This inherent
tension between providers and payors in the fee-for-service reimbursement
model has created two enormous waves about to crash into each other,
leaving the pati ent-consumer in the middle of the fragmented and
uncoordinated healthcare delivery system storM 239
The A CA propelled the movement toward i ncentivi zi ng care coordination
and, thus, implemented incentives to replace the traditional fee-for-service
reimbursement model with fee-for-value reimbursement models.240 To
achieve the overall goals of high-quality, low-cost health care, providers and
insurance companies must align financial incentives to achieve the necessary
pubs/research reports/R R800/R R869/RAN D_ R R869.pdf.
235. Fee for Service (FFS), HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES, http://www.hci3.org/thought-
leadership/why-incentives-matter/fee-for-service (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) [hereinafter
HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES]
236. Id.
237. Kelly M. Bryant Fee-for-Service 101: What it Means for Your Organization,
PALADINA HEALTH (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.paladinahealth.com/blog/fee-service-101-
what-it- means-your-organi zati on. Patients rmay experience an impersonal and hurried
appointment because health care providers limit appointment times because if providers see
more patients in a day, they will also receive more payment under a fee-for-service model. Id.
238. Jose L. Gonzalez, A Managed Care Organization-s Medical Malpractice Liability
for Denial of Care: The Lost World, 35 Hous. L. REV. 715, 724(1998).
239. HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES, supra note 235 (noting that the fee-for-service
reimbursement model is the 'single biggest contributor to excessive use of services and the
fragmentation of the [United States] delivery system_); see Bryant supra note237(noting that
the lack of coordination caused by the fee-for-service reimbursement model has accounted for
$25-$45 billion in annual wasted health care spending). The fee-for-service reimbursement
system actually incentives providers to avoid collaboration and coordination as a way to
generate more services individually. Id.
240. Caleb Clarke, How the Affordable Care Act Will Affect
Provider Reimbursement, NUEMD, http://www.nuem-d.com/blog/affordable-care-act-
will-affect-provider-reimbursement (last visited Mar. 10, 2016); VALENCE HEALTH,
PROVIDER-SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS: THE ULTIMATE VALUE-BASED HEALTHCARE PLAN 1
(2015) [hereinafter VALENCE HEALTH White Paper].
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coordination of care and the value necessary to be reimbursed under a fee-
for-value reimbursement model.241 T his change in the financial structure will
influence insurers, as financers of heath care, to transform into a more
coordinated structure as well.242 As payment structures adapt to the value
incentives, the traditional structure of the current healthcare delivery and
financing systems must adapt as well. For example, 'hospitals that enter the
insurance business may be able to better design quality care programs by
becoming a unified organization and removing competing incentives. 243
Coordinated care is thought to be the industry-s route to achieve the
ultimate goals of high-quality and cost-effective health care.24 'Blurring the
lines between insurers and providers and ushering in the era of coordi nated
care_ will achi eve the integration within the delivery and financing of health
care that is necessary to achieve quality and cost goals.245 Value-based
reimbursement models transfer financial risk and clinical control to the
providers and away from the payors.246 New responsibilities, payment
structures, and rei mbursement pressures will force healthcare systems to take
on new roles beyond the role as the mere provider of health services.247
B. The Proposal
The structure of today-s health insurance companies is changing.24 The
traditional and current health insurance market will transform into a system
that incentivizes stakeholders to deliver low-cost, high-quality health care.
The main stakeholders in the healthcare financing system primarily include
241. Joe Mott By Aligning Financial Incentives, Intermountain Healthcare Will Help
Everyone Who-s Involved in Healthcare Get Better Results for More Affordable Cost,
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://interrmountainhealthcare.org/blogs/
2015/01/aligning-financial-incentives-will-help-lead-to-more-affordable-costs.
242. Bob Herman, Providers Becoing Payors: Should Hospitals StartTheir Own Health
Plans?, BECKER-S HEALTHCARE (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.
com/fi nance/provi ders-becomi ng-payors-shoul d-hospital s-start-their-own-health-plans.html
[hereinafter Herman, Providers Becoming Payors].
243. Ellison, supra note 172.
244. Kathleen Sebelius, The Affordable Care Act at Three: Paying for Quality Saves
Health Care Dollars, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Mar. 20, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2013/03/20/the-affordable-care-act-at-three-payi ng-for-qual ity-saves-health-care-
dollars/. The ACA created Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) as way to incentivize
providers to collaborate and provide coordinated care. Id. ACOs manage the cost of quality
of patient care to ultimately reach of goal of improved care coordination and safety. Id.
245. Joseph Burns, Reform Forces Health Insurers to Reinvent Themselves, MANAGED
CARE (Apr. 2012), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2012/4/reform-forces-health-
insurers-reinvent-thermselves.
246. VALENCE HEALTH White Paper, supra note 240, at l.
247. Margaret Dick Tocknell, 1 in 5 Health Systems to Become Payers by 2018, HEALTH
LEADERS MEDIA (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.healthleadersrredia.con/health-plans/1-5-
health-systems-become-payers-2018.
248. Burns, supra note 245.
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the provider and the third-party insurer existing as separate and distinct
business entities.249 Through the patient-s eyes, after the provider delivers
care to the patient, the providerthen bills the patient-s third-party insurer, and
the transaction is complete. What the patient does not see is the lengthy, and
tedious, 'behind the scenes_ contracting action between the providers and
insurance companies. Patients are insulated from insurer-provider
reimbursement negotiations that define the scope of patient care. The
traditional negotiations relating to the reimbursement contract between
insurers and providers result in a 'win-lose negotiation focused on rates. 250
The pressures stemming from new reimbursement structures emphasizing
population health will lead health systems to consider launching their own
health insurance plans. 25 1 Many scholars propose specific dates as to when
health insurance companies, as the nation traditionally knows them, will be
extinct,25 2 but this article emphasizes the way the lines between health
insurance companies and providers will blur, eliminating the traditional role
of health insurance companies.
Under the new managed care model, hospitals are pressured to manage a
patient-s total health care, as well as the total cost of that care.253 New
opportunities may stem fromthese new responsibilities.25 As hospitals begin
to manage patient care and risk, 'they-re sort of halfway toward being an
insurance company. _255 When a health system operates and controls a health
plan, the premium dollars stay in the health system and 'a smaller fraction
walks out the door. 256 In a model where healthcare providers serve as
insurers, traditionally misaligned incentives of providers and insurers are
eliminated. In the traditional fee-for-service model, providers are financially
249. Ellison, supra note 172.
250. Burns, supra note 245.
251. Margaret Dick Tocknell, 1 in 5 Health Systems to Become Payers by 2018, HEALTH
LEADERS MEDIA (Aug. 20, 2013), http://healthleadersmedia.compage-1/H E P-295415/1-in-5-
Heal th-Systems-to-B ecome-Payers-by-201 8##.
252. See, e.g., id. (noting that 1 in 5 health systems will become health insurance payers
by 2018).
253. Roni Caryn Rabin, Some Hospital Networks Also Become Insurers, WASH. POST
(Aug. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/some-hospital-networks-also-
become-insurers/201 2/08/25/53e90a72-eb1 d- 11 el-b811-09036bcbl 82bstory.html.
254. See Phil Kamp, Industry Perspective: Less Risky Than It Seems: Provider-
Sponsored Health Plans Take Hold, VALENCE HEALTH, http://valencehealth.com/uploads/
files/ alence_ HealthIndustry Perspective_ L ess_ R iskyT han-itSeems.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2016) (noting that a health system that operates a health plan may incur new
responsibilities such as: 'claims payment customer service, insurance reporting and other
administrative operations_).
255. Rabin, supra note253.
256. Kamp, supra note 254; see Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258 (noting
that a provider-sponsored health plan frees providers 'from having to share with insurance
companies any savings they generate from improved quality and efficiency_).
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incentivized to keep hospital beds full. However, when the provider also
takes on the role of insurer, these traditionally-contrasting goals are aligned
to one coordinated goal of keeping the patient-member healthy and costs
low. 257
Health systems, however, do not want to replicate the financial losses that
occurred in the 1990s. 258 Providers are thus cautiously examining the options
and slowly approaching the new provider-owned health plans. 259 Although
leaders of provider-owned health plans say the implementation of these plans
is 'a long slog to positive margins,_ health systems can initially seek
partnerships with insurers.26 Moreover, health systems can hire internally or
utilize third-party administrators to initially aid in their financial risk
management.261
If health systems seek to compete with traditional health plans on the
market, they will be required to effectively manage risk in order to get a share
of the dollars.262 H i ring an in-house insurance team may not be the most
viable option for a health system initially. To understand and better manage
the risk that a health system will incur by operating as an insurance company,
the system may contract with a health plan management company. 263 To
combat the initial difficulties associated with operating a health plan,
providers may employ consulting firms to aid and advise the operation of
their new health plans.264
257. Bob Herman, The Risks of Provider-Operated Health Plans: Are the Rewards
Worthwhile?, BECKER-s Hosp. REV. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.
corn/payer-i ssues/the- risks-of-provider-operated-health-plans-are-the-rewards-
worthwhile.html [Herman, The Risks].
258. Bob Herman, More Health Systems Launch Insurance Plans Despite Caveats,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.rmodernhealthcare.com/article/20150404/
magazine/304049981 [hereinafter Herman, More Health Systems].
259. Id.
260. Id. However, health insurance companies may not wait to aid competing provider
networks gain traction in the insurance market. Id.
261. Molly Gamble, Health Systems Becoming Payers: 8 Observations, BECKERIS
Hosp. REV. (July 8, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.comfinance/health-systems-
beconing-payers-8-observations.html; see Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258
(noting one CEO of a large health system stated, 'We are going to do our insurance products
through established health plans_). Newly-formed provider-owned health plans may need the
help of third party insurance administrators to manage the possible sicker population that may
find the health system-s narrow network, low premium attractive. Id.; see also supra Partl.C.
262. Burns, supra note 245.
263. Id. Partnering with national insurers is a viable option for health systems entering
into the insurance game. Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258. To gain expertise
within the market without assuming total patient risk, one safe option for provider health
systems seeking to enter into the insurance market is to offer the initial health plans to a narrow
population, such as a Medicare Advantage plan. Id.
264. Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258.
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C. Benefits
Health systems can effectively eliminate their reliance on third-party
insurance companies by creating their own health plan.2 65 This will allow
systems to provide necessary care and simultaneously control the financing
of that care, creating a more efficient, and better-quality delivery of health
care.2 6 6 Overall, hospital-provided health plans produce higher quality ratings
by consumers.267
By offering a narrow network to policyholders of their provider-owned
health plans, health systems can maximize and estimate their patient volume
more accurately and efficiently.268 In creating their own health plans, systems
also have the potential to generate more revenue that can be reinvested in
hospital infrastructure and within the comm-unity. 269 For example,
Pennsylvania-s Geisinger Health System receives $1.3 billion in revenue
from operating Geisinger Health Plan.270 Increased revenue can also allow
health systems to 're-engineer [their] care to get better outcomes. 271
Healthcare providers have the potential to increase clinical coordination
by aligning the incentives between the deliverers and the financers of health
care.2 72  Under coordinated care models, the traditional contracted
relationship between insurers and providers will be based on 'data, care
management, and analytics,_ rather than the flawed negotiation system based
265. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
266. Id. The CEO of Premier Health Plan, a provider-sponsored health plan, stated: 'For
us, the insurance business is just a vehicle to cover as many lives as we can in our service area
with our population health initiatives. - Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258.
267. Austin Frakt, When Hospital Systems Buy Health Insurers, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST
(May 27, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconoist.com/wordpress/upshot-vertical-
integrati on/.; cf., El Ii son, supra note 172 (noting a study that found that seventy percent of the
increased premiums derived from health systems operating health insurers did not result in
higher quality of care).
268. Gunjan Khanna et al., Provider-Led Health Plans: The Next Frontier - or the1990s
All Over Again?, McKINSEY & Co. 1, 1 (2015), http://healthcare.mckinsey.com/sites/default/
fi I es/Provider-led%20health%20plans. pdf.
269. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257. Costs of incremental health care are often less
for providers as compared to payors. VALENCE HEALTH White Paper, supra note 240, at 2.
For example, an episode of care night cost a traditional insurer $50,000. However, a health
system sustains out-of-pocket costs that are limited to the variable costs associated with
providing care. In many instances, the variable cost of care often is less than - percent of the
total amount billed to an insurer.
Id. Provider-sponsored health plans have an opportunity to generate non-profit revenue that
can be reinvested directly into the health system. Rick Bobos, Is a Provider-Sponsored Health
Plan Right For You?, VALENCE HEALTH (Mar. 20, 2014), http://hfrmky.org/downloads/
valence_ health is a provider sponsored health plan rightjfor you.pdf.
270. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
271. Id.
272. K amp, supra note 254.
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on rates for individual units of health services.273 The ability to keep care
decisions within the health system, rather than relying on third-party
insurance companies, has its advantages as it relates to quality patient care.274
The transition into a payor role may lower the costs for healthcare systems
by creating a more efficient and more aligned del ivery of care model .275 T he
era of lower reimbursement rates has arrived.276 Providers will no longer be
reimbursed for each unit of service, but rather reimbursed for efficiency. To
achieve efficiency, healthcare providers must create delivery models that
retain cost and deliver high-quality care. 27 The arms race to consolidate has
allowed providers to create large networks of care, encompassing the
systems- necessity to deliver coordinated, seamless, and efficient care.
Providers can utilize these larger networks and benefit from value-based
incentives by creating their own health plan that would offer insurance for
health services on their network. Embarking into the health insurance market
can prove valuable in terms of finances and quality.278
The first dollar capture is one of the major advantages for provider-
sponsored health plans. 2 79 The dollars available within the healthcare
industry are limited, but as a result of consolidation, large health systems
have access to the capital necessary to acquire health plans and acquire the
first dollar amidst the wave of lower reimbursements.28 0 Provider-owned
health plans are achieving more financial success as compared to other health
plan insurers.28 1 Healthcare providers are not only able to compete with large
insurers, but can also reduce their systems total cost margin by
consolidating. The FTC is currently blocking the proposed merger between
Advocate Health Care ('Advocate_) and NorthShore University Health
System ('NorthShore_), a merger that would have created Illinois- largest
healthcare delivery system 282 Both parties are currently arguing their cases
273. Burns, supra note 245.
274. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
275. Ellison, supra note 172.
276. J ess White & Renee Cocchi, Medical ReiTburserrent, HEALTHCARE Bus. & TECH.
(2014), http://www.healthcarebusinesstech.commedical-reim-bursement/.
277. Burns, supra note245.
278. Health systems entering into the insurance market must be aware that implementing
their own health plans may conflict with current insurance companies. Herman, More Health
Systems, supra note 258. When starting a new health plan directly challenges and competes
with insurers for the first dollar, tension between the provider and the insurer may arise,
specifically when a provider is attempting to negotiate with the insurer for membership in its
network. Id.
279. K amp, supra note 254.
280. Burns, supra note245.
281. Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258 ('Premiums collected by provider-
owned plans rose father in 2014 (5.5%) than at publicly traded insurers (2.4%), Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans (2.5%), and others in the industry (3.2%). _.
282. Advocate and NorthShore Combine to Create Preeminent Health Care Systemr
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before an Illinois court, and Advocate and NorthShore are proposing a pro-
competitive argument that has never been offered before in a merger
challenge.283 To bolster their proposed merger to the FTC, Advocate and
NorthShore proposed a new coordinated health insurance product that would
be offered on the market at a price at least ten percent lower than the cheapest
comparable health plan.28
Additionally, a health system operating a provider-owned health plan is
incentivized to manage and focus on preventative care.285 By focusing on
preventative care, overall healthcare costs decrease and patients benefit from
better quality care.286 T he traditional function of the insurance company may
decline if healthcare providers continue to enter into the insurance business.
This could effectively eliminate the traditional function of the insurance
company as an individual stakeholder at odds with the health provider.287
'Once the system becomes an insurer, picking up the tab for a hospitalization
rather than generating income from it, more resources will be devoted to
preventative care. 288
D. Already Happening
Health systems realize that the traditional negotiations for individual units
of services are over. Now, health systems fully understand that in today-s
health care delivery market, '[n]o outcome, no income. 289 The idea of
systems offering health plans is not novel. Thirteen percent of healthcare
systems in the United States offer a health plan.290 For over thirty years,
NORTHSHORE, http://www.northshore.org/newsroom/press-releases/northshore-advocate-
merger/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); see Peter Frost, Advocate, NorthShore Punch Back at
FTC, C RAIN s (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.chicagobusiness.comarti cle/201 60323/N EWS03/
1 60329925/advocate-and-northshore-punch-back-agai nst-ftc (noting the recent activity in
response to the FTC block of the proposed Advocate and NorthShore merger).
283. Lisa Schencker, Uphill FTC Fight Starts this Week for Big Chicago-Area Health
Systems, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.rmodernhealthcare.com/article/
20160404/NEWS/1 60409959/uphi Il-ftc-fight-starts-this-week-for-big-chicago-area-health-
systems.
284. Frost, supra note 282.
285. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
286. Ellison, supra note 172.
287. B urns, supra note 245 ( 'T he models being ermulated are similar to organizations such
as Geisinger and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) that are already in the
insurance business... They operate hospitals, medical groups, and HMOs._); see Ellison,
supra note 172 (noting the new trend in health care that health systems are buying insurance
companies and operating their own health plan).
288. Rabin, supra note 253
289. Burns, supra note 245.
290. Bara Vaida & Alexander Wess, Health Care Consolidation, ALL HEALTH (Nov.
2015), http://www.allhealth.org/publications/Consolidation-Toolkit_169.pdf.
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health systems have played the dual role of both provider and payor,291 but
now that role is likely to be played by the new consolidated health systems.292
The largest managed care organization in the United States, Kaiser
Permanente, has been operating as a health plan and a provider since 1945.293
Kaiser is made up of three separate, yet cooperative, entities including:
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and
Permanente Medical Groups.29 Kaiser has effectively produced a structure
that successfully aligns the goals of the health plan and medical group,
implementing total accountability for a global budget.295 KaiserS health plan
and healthcare providers 'share in the goal, reflected in the organization-s
capitated payment system, of keeping patients healthy while optimizing
utilization. 296 Rather than focusing on producing a high-volume of services,
a goal inherent in a fee-for-service reimbursement model, Kaiser is
financially incentivized to 'provide high quality, affordable care and manage
population health,_ as a result of its integrated and managed care structure.297
Kaiser is simultaneously a provider and payor, and this dual role allows
Kaiser to align incentives leading to an improvement of the communitys
overall health.298
The coordination of the three Kaiser entities provides a 'common vision,
joint decision-making, and aligned incentives._ 29 The success of Kaisers
high-quality integrated health care and health plans is further evidence of
what can result from providers offering health plans. According to a National
Committee for Quality Assurance report, Kaiser-s health plans have achieved
top national scores in consumer experience, disease prevention, and overall
291. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
292. The trend of provider-owned health plans is increasing, but '[pirovider-owned plans
cover less than 10% of the entire privately insured market._ Herman, More Health Systems,
supra note 258.
293. Word-s Out: Kaiser Perrmnente Health Plans Among Nation-s Best, PR NEWSWIRE
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.comnews-releases/words-out-kaiser-perrmnente-
health-plans-among-nations-best-300145297. htnl [hereinafter Word-s Out].
294. Douglas McCarthy et al., Kaiser Perrmnente: Bridging the Quality Divide with
Integrated Practice, Group Accountability, and Health Information Technology, 17
COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2 (June 2009), http://www.comrmonwealthfund.org/-/medial
F i I es/Publ i cati ons/Case%20Study/2009/J un/1 278 M cCarthy_ Kaisercase-Study_624_updat
e.pdf.
295. Jesse Pines et al., Kaiser Perrmnente - California: A Model for Integrated Care for
the Ill and Injured, BROOKINGS INST. (May 4, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu//redial
Research/Files/Papers/2015/05/04-ermergency-
medicine/050415E rmerMedCaseStudyKaiser.pdfla=en.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. What Health Systems Can Learn from Kaiser Perrmanente: An Interview with Hal
Wolf, HEALTH INT L 18, 20 (Nov. 8, 2009).
299. McCarthy et al., supra note 294.
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healthcare treatment 3 0o
A ni dst the wave of managed care in the 1980s, the decisi on-makers for
Pennsylvania-based Geisinger Health System realized that as the delivery of
care was changing, the financing of that care would also change.301 As a
result, the Geisinger Health System created the Geisinger Health Plan.302 The
Geisinger Health Plan sustains the system-s care coordination goals and
provides the financial accountability necessary for the system to start caring
about the quality and cost of a patients continuum of care.os
In 2015, a subsidiary of Ascension Health, the largest not-for-profit
healthcare provider based in St. Louis, released its plan to buy an insurance
company licensed in states throughout the Mi dwest.3" T he transaction will
allow a health system to offer its narrow provider network on a state health
insurance exchange.301 'The acquisition makes a lot of sense ... Hospitals
are now expected to manage population health and owning a health plan
provides both infrastructure and a way to connect more directly with
insurance purchasers. _306
The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) is another example
demonstrating the recently developed alliance between health plans and
healthcare providers. 0 The UPMC operates the UPMC Health Plan and
simultaneously acts as a healthcare provider and health insurer.308 UPMC
Health Plan insureds have access to the various UPMC systems as well as
other community providers that have contracted with the UPMC Health
Plan.30 The UPMC-S integrated delivery and financing system provides
patients with high-quality care at lower costs.3 10
The private insurance exchanges created under the A CA have generated
an easy route for health systems to offer their own narrow network health
300. Word-s Out, supra note 293.
301. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
302. Id.
303. Douglas McCarthy et al., Geisinger Health System Achieving the Potential of
System Integration Through Innovation, Leadership, Measurement, and Incentives,
COMMONWEALTH FUND 3 (June 2009), http://www.comrmonwealthfund.org//rredia/Files/
Publications/Case%20Study/2009/ un/M cCarthy Geisi nger case-study_624 update.pdf.
304. Jay Greene, Ascension Health Subsidiary to Buy Michigan Health Insurer for $50
Million, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb, 20, 2015), http://www.rmodernhealthcare.comarticle/
20150220/N EWS/1 50229987.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Burns, supra note245.
308. Health Plan Introduces New Individual Products, UPMC (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.upmc.com/mredia/NewsR eleases/2012/Pages/health-plan-introduces-new-
products.aspx.
309. UPMC Facts & Stats, UPMC, http://www.upmc.comabout/facts/pages/default.
aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
310. Id.
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plans and to compete with large national health insurers.31 Further, prior to
value-based reimbursement and capitated payment models, health systems
did not have the infrastructure or incentives to enter into the insurance
business.312 With recent acquisitions of physician practices, rehabilitation
centers, and skilled nursing facilities, systems now have access to a broad
network of services.1 Managing population health and achieving success
under value-based reimbursement models require scale.314 With scale, health
systems will have a large risk pool that is necessary to sustain a health plan-s
risk pool. Further, through consolidation, a health system will own various
facilities that will attract consumers to a narrow network health plan.
These examples demonstrate varying degrees of control, services, and
financial strategies. Each model is uniquewhilestill delivering integrated and
coordinated care through the traditional provider structure adapted to the not-
so-traditional regulatory and industry changes. These models demonstrate the
range of potential future health care delivery models.
E. Disadvantages
The newly-proposed dual role of the health care provider as both an insurer
and provider will yield different benefits, but also present new challenges to
providers attempting to play in the insurance game. There are potential
downsides to hospital health plans for consumers as well as health systems.
One of those downsides is the narrow network health plan that provider-
insurers will offer. 15
A narrow network health plan limits the insured-s provider choice in
exchange for a less-costly health plan premi UM 3 16 A narrow network refers
to the network of providers that policy-holders of a specific health plan can
use and visit.31 By offering fewer options to consumers, narrow networks
311. Susan Kelly, As U.S. Insurers Aim to Get Bigger, Hospitals Plan Entry, REUTERS
(Oct. 13, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.reuters.comarticle/us-usa-healthcare-hospitals-
idUSKCNOS621 E20151013.
312. Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258.
313. K elly, supra note 311.
314. Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258.
315. Cf., Seth Trueger, Narrow Networks: The Result of Cormpetition, Not the Barrier,
MDAWARE.ORG (Oct. 13, 2013), http://mdaware.blogspot.com/2015/10/narrow-networks-
result-of-comrpetition.html (noting that narrow networks can actually be a positive aspect of
the health care industry). Although narrow networks may reduce consumer choice, narrow
networks do not demonstrate the lack of competition within the health care industry. Id.
Instead, '[n]arrow networks are the result of competition and negotiation in the health
insurance market. Id.
316. Laura Summer, Health Plan Features: Implications of Narrow Networks and the
Trade-Off Between Price and Choice, ACADEMY HEALTH, http://academyhealth.org/files/
HCFO/RIBrief03l5.pdf (lastvisited Mar. 15, 2016).
317. David Blumenthal, Reflecting on Health Reform - Narrow Networks: Boom or
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intend to limit access to high-costing specialists and technologies. 18
Consumers are attracted to narrow network health plans, typically as a result
of their low premi um amount319
T he health system-s decision to enter into the health insurance market will
involve more than merely hiring a third-party administrator or an actuarial
company and retrieving reserve capital .320 The new provi der-owned health
plan will require a unique and detailed plan design, an integrated claims
processing system, customer service, and marketing.321
The costs associated with health systems becoming health insurers may
also act as a barrier to the transition. 322 The initial start-up costs for a system
to start its own plan for an integrated network can be steep.323 Additionally,
to become an insurer, a hospital must acquire an additional state Ii cense.324
To receive the license, the hospital must have 'millions of dollars in capital
reserves and must run a regulatory gantl et to prove it has an adequate provider
network and can delivery required benefits._325 The pool of health systems
that have the ample resources necessary to obtain a license and meet capital
reserve requirements is narrow.326 Further, a study that researched hospital-
insurer integration found that insurance plans that were offered by hospitals
had higher premiums. 327
Health systems that implement a provider-sponsored health plan take on
full clinical and financial responsibility, which can initially appear
overwhelming.3 28 To implement a health plan, health systems must establish
Bane?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
publ ications/blog/2014/feb/narrows-networks-boon-or-bane.
318. Rabin, supra note 253; see Blumenthal, supra note 317 (noting that the most
expensive doctors and hospitals are typically excluded in a narrow network plan, which can
be a major problem for patients with complex and rare health conditions).
319. Summer, supra note 316.
320. Gary Ahlquist et al., Several Hundred Health Networks Will Become Payors,
STRATEGY & 1, 3 ( une 20, 2014), http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/health-networks-
become-payors.
321. Id.
322. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
323. Id. (noting that a health system should anticipate spending around $50 million to start
their own health plan, 'which could limit other capital investments_); see Herman, More
Health Systems, supra note 258 (notingthatthe 'safest option for provider systerms for now ...
may be offering insurance products that serve a narrow population, such as a Medicare
Advantage or Medicaid plan, or creating loose partnerships with insurance companies_).
324. Rabin, supra note 253.
325. Id.
326. K elly, supra note 311.
327. Austin F rakt, supra note 267
328. VALENCE HEALTH White Paper, supra note 240, at 1. Although assuming risk may
appear overwhelming, '[tihe reality is that taking on more risk can ultimately yield more
benefits. - Id. Studies demonstrates that thirty to forty percent of all medical expenses are
wasteful and thirty cents of every health care dollar is spent on administrative costs rather than
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an effective infrastructure, construct collaborative networks, and advertise
the new health plan brand.3 29 To create an effective health plan, providers
must aimto enroll at least 100,000 patient-members to achieve the necessary
risk pool.330 Although in theory, cutting out the middleman--the insurer--
would appear to save money, there isa deep-rooted history between hospitals
and insurance companies that make this idea difficult and complicated to
achieve.33 1 'Hospitals cannot flip a switch to go from a provider to an
insurer, _332 but the cost and quality benefits that health systems can derive
from the new role of an insurer will likely prove to be advantageous.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 2010, the ACA sparked unprecedented changes within the health
care industry. To correspond and comply with the changes, it will be
necessary for the industry and its payment system to correspondently focus
on shifting the status quo.3  T he concern that only a few large companies
will act as the minute number of players in the health insurance game is real;
however, the concern may become obsolete if health systems continue to
enter into the insurance game.
As evidenced by the potential outcome of only three main insurers in the
United States, the insurance game and the traditional market pressures are
already changing.3 3 s T he consolidation trend began before the creation of the
ACA, but the ACA has become one of the main drivers of the current
consolidation trend within the healthcare industry. Although the intentions of
the consolidating i nsurance companies may be questioned, consolidation will
lead to larger provider networks with an increased potential in delivering
cost-effective and high-quality health care. Even with the potential toachieve
the low-cost, high-quality goals of the ACA, the proposed mergers are
contingent on FTC approval. T he FTC reviews the proposed mergers to
patient care. Id. Provider-sponsored health plans provide a way for providers to reduce waste
and administrative overhead. Id.
329. Herman, More Health Systems, supra note 258.
330. Kelly, supra note 311.
331. Rabin, supra note 253; Bob Herman, Why Hospital-Owned Health Plans Are Big
Like Cheese in Wisconsin, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.rmodern
healthcare.comarticle/20151209/NEWS/1 51209857.
332. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
333. See EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 347(2014) ('The
ACA is stimulating a transformation of the entire American health care system... [b]efore
the ACA, the American health care system was literally killing the country._).
334. Herman, The Risks, supra note 257.
335. K elly, supra note 311 (noting that 'the chance to gain market share and cut expenses
by eli ni nati ng the insurer as the ni ddleman is attracting hospitals again, particularly if the top
five U.S. health insurers consolidate into three players); see Part I.
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safeguard against unfair methods of competition and unfair practices.
Although the FTC has recently blocked some major healthcare system,
provider, and insurer mergers, whether the FTC possesses sufficient
resources to hold back the consolidation storm remains unanswered.
Under this article-s proposed model, the hands collecting the insurance
premi uns will also deliver the care.1 6 T he CF 0 at a maj or health system was
quoted saying, 'We shag every fly ball a health plan hitsto us--anACO here,
a bundle experiment there... Maybe it-s time we take the plunge and
become an insurer ourself. _ Although there may be some downsides in
creating a health plan, the long term benefits associated with a health system
operating as a provider and an insurer likely outweigh the initial cost and
structural burdens.338 Providers that successfully implement and operate their
own health plans have the potential to drastically change the delivery and
financing of health care in a positive way. The stunning vol ume of mergers
has increased the notice, concern, and attraction to the current healthcare
events. With that attention, the industry has the opportunity to gain awareness
of the issues to create and structure a better, less-costly healthcare delivery
system. Just as a car owner has an incentive to take his or her car to the shop
for consistent oil changes, providers playing the dual-role of an insurer and a
provider will also have a financial incentive to maintain the health of their
patient-population.
336. Dana Blankenhorn, Vertical Integration Cormes to Health Care, Street (Aug. 20,
2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.thestreet.comstory/11668844/1/vertical-integration-com-es-to-
health-care. html.
337. Ahlquist et al., supra note 320.
338. See Herman, The Risks, supra note 257 (noting that although '[a] lot of backend
work is required to make a provider-operated health plan successful .. . benefits come in the
long run_).
339. Blankenhorn, supra note336.
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